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Abstract
This thesis paper is an analysis of the
relationship between defence policy and the unification
of the Canadian Armed Forces.' While much of the
literature and commentary in recent years has centered
upon the *management* aspects of unification, this thesis
argues that unification was devised in order to re-assert
civilian control and direction over the services.
Unification then, affects not only the administration
of the services, but aiso, the * structuring of influence*
between the civilian authority and the defence
establishment, which in turn contributes to the method
through which defence priorities are determined.
The thesis also examines the congruence between
the 'structuring of influence* as it pertains to defence
policy and the transition in the policy-making process,
which was to become evident as the avenues of political
input expanded, differentiated and centralized.

To this

end, the thesis shall discuss the transition in the
policy-making process during the tenure of Prime
Ministers Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau in relation
to the corresponding re-definition of defence priorities.

A cknowledgem ent s
Although unification of the Canadian Armed
Forces has been subject to a great deal of analysis and
criticism since its inception in 1963, such research
has tended to provide evidence as to the issues and
events which ensued, without however, paying sufficient
attention to the interpretation of such evidence. The
need for such an analysis is particularly acute because
the ramifications of unification are still being felt.
The Canadian military in recent years has undertaken
a concerted search for a professional identity within
the parameters prescribed by a re-orientation of
defence priorities and by the *civilianization* of the
defence establishment.

In more recent months, the

introduction of a separate Air Command has clearly
presaged de-unification and the return to elemental,
that is, land, sea and air command structures.

This

thesis then, examines unification within the context of
defence policy and the policy-making process.
While little effort is expended in an evaluation
of unification per se, that is, in terms of its stated
objectives, the author's bias is most favourable to
unification. While recognizing that unification may
not be applicable to considerably larger and more
complex military establishments, unification is most
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amenable to Canada, given our defence requirements
and national objectives.
*

*

*

*

*

It is certainly appropriate at this time to
express my gratitude to the thesis supervisors: Prof.
N. Nyiri, Wilfred Laurier University, the principal
supervisor, who introduced me to the theoretical
concepts employed within the thesis and who regularly
made himself available for discussion and criticism
of the thesis as it progressed; Dr. John Gellner,
University of Toronto, whose comprehensive insight
into Canadian defence problems was an immeasurable
asset; Dr. Rod Preece, Wilfred Laurier University,
whose expertise in the English language rescued the
author on numerous occasions.
J•C.H •
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Introduction
The unification controversy which erupted
during the tenure of Paul Hellyer, Minister of National
Defence, has created a crisis in Canadian civilmilitary relations.

The severity of the crisis was

revealed through the premature * retirement* of several
senior officers, and the outright dismissal of Rear
Admiral Landymore(l), for opposition to Mr. Hellyer*s
agenda for unification.

Superficially, the conflict

between the Minister and the service chiefs arose
because of Mr. Hellyer*s proposal, not only to integrate,
but to unify the forces, effectively eliminating the
separate service branches.

The implications of the

debate however, had far more serious connotations,
because what was fundamentally at issue was the
sovereignty of the civilian authority over the military.
This obviously did not mean that the military in Canada
cherished aspirations to imitate the Seven Days in May(2)
syndrome and usurp the constitutional government, but

(1) Landymore was fired because he sought to organize,
political opposition to unification through actively
soliciting support for his views from the Navy.
Hellyer argues that since unification already had the
approval of Pearson and the Cabinet Defence Committee,
Landymore*s actions were inexcusable. Interview with
Paul Hellyer, August 29, 1975.
(2) Seven Days in May A movie produced during the mid1960*s, in which a U.S. Army general, reminiscent of
General Douglas MacArthur, plotted to overthrow the
U.S. government because of the indecisiveness of its
President.
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it did nonetheless indicate that the military had
intruded into the policy sector, which Mr. Hellyer
considered intolerable and hence, set out to rectify.
Of critical importance is why Mr. Hellyer was
so adamant in his refusal to curtail the reorganization
process at the integration stage, pursuant to the
recommendations of the Glassco Commission(3).

Had he

done so, he would have avoided the painful schism which
inevitably emerged between the government and the
military, and in addition, the dismissal of malcontents
in the navy need not have occurred.
Integration, to the military, was reluctantly
palatable, whereas unification was decidedly not. Even
General Foulkes, who had long been a supporter of
integration, balked at unification and subsequently
became one of its most vociferous opponents. LieutenantGeneral Moncel, one of those * retired*, voiced the
opinion that Mr. Hellyer; "appeared to be moving on an
uncharted course, at very, very high speeds towards a very
dim destination."(4)

Nevertheless, despite his critics,

and a chorus of resentment against the eradication of
service traditions, Mr. Hellyer*s message was
unequivocable:

(3)
(4)

Nelsonianism had belatedly met its

Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization.
Hereafter referred to as the Glassco Commission.
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963).
Moncel, Lieutenant-General R.W., "Integration", in Snowy
Owl. (Kingston: Canadian Army Staff College, 1965) p. 23.
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demise and henceforth the military were to be supplicants
to, not protagonists of, government policy.
This research paper examines the relationship
between defence policy and the policy-making process
during the tenure of the Diefenbaker, Pearson and
Trudeau governments.

The emphasis is placed upon how

defence priorities are defined and to what extent
civilian control and direction of the military is effected
relative to the transition which has occurred in the
policy-making process.

The thesis contends that prior

to unification, there was a decided absense of civilian
control over the military, that defence policy had been
surrendered de facto to military influences, and that
unification had been imposed by Paul Hellyer to ensure
the prerogative of the civilian authority to determine
defence policy, a prerogative, which he considered to
be in jeopardy.

It is also asserted that the changes in

defence priorities and in the extent of civilian control
are representative of the transition in the policymaking process itself.
Mr. Diefenbaker was unable to extricate himself
from the morass created by alliance committments and
equipment purchases which he had inherited from the
previous Liberal government because his concept of
policy-making would not permit any departure from
incrementalism.

Because policy-making to Diefenbaker

was personalized, he failed to utilize the sources of
policy input which could have been available to him;
instead, he preferred to rely upon like-minded political
friends.

Since one of these was General Pearkes, whom

Diefenbaker appointed as Minister of National Defence,
the military was to have, in the absence of an
authoritative civilian voice, excessive influence in the
promulgation of defence policy.
The Pearson years were characterized by the
attempt to cultivate new sources of policy initiative
and by allowing the input potential of executive policy
apparatus to develop; such measures being conducive to
innovative rather than incremental policy changes. The
implications for defence were revealed through a
Nreconfiguration

of defence priorities

while at the same

x time maintaining alliance committments, and through a
determined effort by Paul Hellyer to ensure, by means of
* unification, that defence policy would have as its genesis
government policy, not military policy.

Although the

, measures introduced by Mr. Pearson into the policy-making
process and by Mr. Hellyer into defence

did not come to

fruition until Mr. Trudeau took office, the calamitous
events from 1963 to 1968 set the stage for a radical
conception of policy planning of which defence policy
became an integral part.
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The innovations in policy-planning begun under
Pearson were expanded and formalized under Prime Minister
Trudeau.

Many of the previous tenets of policy-making

were discarded, and instead the premises of policy were
to be based upon *rational planning* and *functionalism*,
rather than *departmental* objectives. Trudeau launched
a strident criticism against the basis of defence
planning and insisted upon defence policy being in
conformity with the fulfillment of national objectives.
As many of the defence priorities Trudeau prescribed
were * civilian* in nature, in co-ordination with other
departments, the civilian direction of the Department
of National Defence became more apparent.
The thesis will conclude that unification did
indeed involve a competition between the civilian
authority and the military in the development of
Canada's defence policy and that unification was the
method through which the government asserted its
supremacy.

Yet, as time went on de-unification emerged

as a detectable sign indicating that after all,civilian
supremacy cannot be as total as the government wishes it
to be.

The degree of civilian control which the Trudeau

government sought to effect, namely civilian participation
in virtually all aspects of military policy, has in
fact led to the breakdown of the unification process.
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De-unification illustrates the point that
particularly in a technology-orientated society,
government cannot hope to know and control everything
without jeopardizing the same functions it has sought
to expedite or improve. Excessive concentration of
authority leads to the deterioration of the roles to
be performed, as witnessed by the perceived decline in
military professionalism, or, to the failure to recognize
the necessity for 'special skills' which cannot be
assimilated by a central hierarchy. Such attributes
can be most deleterious to the discharging of Canada's
defence responsibilities.

-

Chapter I:

i-A

-

.

Unification and the Policy Process
in Canada

(1) Scope and Methodology
To examine the relationship between defence
policy and the policy-making process, this research
paper employs the typology of policy-making devised by
G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin.(1)

Doern and Aucoin

focus upon the policy-making roles performed by policy
organizations at the executive level. These organizations
are the Prime Ministers Office (P.M.O.), the Privy
Council Office (P.C.O.), the Treasury Board, the
Department of Finance and other sources of policy input
including advisory councils, White Papers, and Royal
Commissions.

Doern and Aucoin have concentrated upon

the sources of policy input because they express the
concern that policy analysts have tended to pay excessive
attention to policy 'actors' and policy 'outputs* rather
than focusing upon the affect of the policy process
itself upon policy, that is, they are ultimately
concerned with the * conversion* of policy inputs into
outputs.(2)

The implications of Doern and Aucoin*s

research is that policy cannot be considered simply as
the * allocation of values* but rather that policy is

(1) Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin, Peter, (ed.) The Structures
of Policy-Making in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1971).
(2) Aucoin, Peter, "Theory and Research in the Study of
Policy-Making" in Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin, Peter.
op_. cit. p. 11 •
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affected by the characteristics of the structures in
which it is developed.
The second and third sections of this chapter
then, are devoted to the models of policy-making
outlined by Doern and Aucoin and to the typologies of
policy-making which they ascribe to Messrs. Diefenbaker,
Pearson and Trudeau.
The fourth section in this chapter critically
appraises other research and explications of unification.
The approach therein is to assess three papers on
unification which have largely focused upon the
•integration* aspects or upon the *rationalization of
management*.

The paper will also consider other factors

such as operational efficacy and nationalism to determine
what effect they may have had on the decision to unify
the armed forces.

In addition, the observations and

recommendations of the Glassco Commission shall be cited,
particularly with reference to the civilian control and
direction of the services.
Implicit to such an appraisal is the recognition
that unification has been commented upon extensively in
the press, and in both military and academic circles.
However, it is the contention of this paper that such
analyses, while undoubtedly providing some insight into
the complexities of unification, do not provide a
satisfactory explanation of it.

Nor do operational

-

J..+

efficacy or nationalism provide appropriate categories
for examination, although they may have been contributory
factors.

Even the Glassco Commission*s recommendations

were predicated on integration.
The Glassco Commission however, did touch upon
a very significant point, that of civilian control.
The issue of civilian control and the Canadian experience
with it remain critical to an understanding of unification.
Civilian control, which is discussed in sections five
and six, has had a particularly unflattering legacy in
Canada since the Second World War, and it becomes of
paramount importance in an age of nuclear weapons and
long-range delivery systems.

It is the purpose then,

of these sections to establish that there have been in
fact, many precedents to illustrate that civilian control
over the Canadian military is something less than
inviolable.
Having examined the evidence to support the
thesis that civilian control had been impaired by the
military, Chapters II, III and IV will analyse the
relationship between defence policy and the policy-making
process in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau
governments, respectively.

- 15 - .

(2) Doern and Aucoin:

Policy-Making Models

The neglect of the conversion stage in policy
analysis is attributed, according to Doern and Aucoin,
to the assimilation of research methods which are more
readily applicable to American political institutions.
The incongruity of such American models for the Canadian
policy process is made evident through the comparison
of the President and his non-elected advisors and the
policy role of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.

In

addition, the American policy system exhibits a *greater
visibility of conflict* due to the early differentiation
of roles brought about by the constitutional separation
of power.(3)

As a consequence, the American policy

analyst perceives policy through *decision-making*
models subject to the vagaries of pluralism.

Because

of such ambiguities between Canadian and American
political systems, Doern and Aucoin set out to critically
examine the shortcomings of such theoretical constructs
in order to emphasize the need to study the * conversion*
process.
Charles Lindblom*s *disjointed incrementalist*
model seeks to describe how policy actors *muddle
through* a number of incrementally different policy
alternatives, while at the same time failing to relate

(3) Doern, G. Bruce and Aucoin., P., op_. cit. p.7.
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various policy types to one another.

By way of example,

defence policy would be derived from prior commitments
without necessarily attempting to relate such policy to
the requirements of foreign policy. Such a model however,
does not allow for the value assumptions of a particular
policy to be questioned, thus fostering conservatism,
nor does the model account for innovative policy.
Policy is therefore seen as an attempt to "alleviate
disruptions in the social and political system without
promoting a 'fundamental* value change."(4)
Since the incrementalist model does not account
for innovative policy, and the rationlist model is
'highly prescriptive', that is, policy-makers proceed
in sequential steps to rank and evaluate both
quantitative and qualitative alternatives, the 'mixed
scanning' model of Amitai Etzioni is seen to
incorporate aspects of both models. He suggests that
the policy-maker will 'scan' alternatives when the
'incrementalist' approach is not satisfactory.

This

'scanning of alternatives' implies a search for
'fundamental* policy changes through the ranking of
high priority items, the choice of alternatives being*
even more circumscribed than those of the rationalist
model.(5)

(4) Aucoin, Peter, op_. cit. pp. 13-14.
(5) Ibid. pp. 14-18 .
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As opposed to first examining the policy process
and then the policy outputs, Theodore Lowi argues that
the outputs of policy must first be catagorized as to
type, and then related back to policy processes, that >is,
differing types of policy correspond, to different
policy-making scenarios.

*Distributive* policies are

those directed to particular groups which are not in
competition with others for the allocation of resources.
This typology of policy-making is labelled * mutual
non-interference* (and could just as easily be called
pork-barrelling) and would include such items as the
awarding of government contracts, tax concessions or
government grants. Distributive policy then is carried
out between relatively few policy actors and a particular
interest group.

'Regulatory* policy refers to policy through

which through the allocation of resources would
* indulge* one group and deprive another.

This would

correspond to the * pluralist* conception

of competing

group interests whereby policy becomes *the residue of
group conflict*.

*Redistributive* policy is similar

to the regulatory type but in this instance concerns
broad social issues or class issues, requiring
relatively permanent coalitions and the participation
of large social or political groups in the policy-making
process.(6)

(6)

Ibid,

pp. 19-22.
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The significance of Doern and Aucoin*s analysis
of policy-making models is that those models which
concentrate on decision-making, that is, the *disjoined
incrementalist* and the *mixed scanning* models,
cannot account for the actual nor unintended policy
outputs, nor for the perceptions of the policy-makers
on policy outputs.

The * rationalist' approach,

emphasizing 'pre-decision-making' factors; "explicate
the logical sequences that should occur and by so
doing...establish a strategy for approaching policy
problems".(7)

Policy-making is thus reducible to a

'micro* concept focusing upon *decision*,

This is of

course unacceptable to Doern and Aucoin because such
conceptualizations do not account, nor attempt to
account, for policy-making being anything other than a
dependent variable.

They do recognize however, that

Lowi*s work, through developing a relationship between
substantive policy and policy-making, at least releases
policy from its dependence upon decision.

To Lowi,

policy-making is a micro concept which results from the
* coercive* aspect of politics, and therefore policy
becomes * something other than undefined outputs
differentiated only by subject matter."(8)

(7)
(8)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 23.
p. 25.
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Doern and Aucoin*s departure from Lowi*s
typology commences by suggesting that not all policy
is of the 'distributive*, *regulatory* or *redistributive*
type; rather, -that an analysis of policy-making must
include a consideration of the * conversion* process
which policy must pass through prior to becoming a
policy output.

Policy-making analysis then, must

examine not only substantive policy but * positional*
policy as well.
"Positional, as opposed to allocative,
policies refer to those outputs which
affect the structuring of influence
in the conversion system, A good deal
of policy activity by individuals and
groups is related not so much to
securing (at least in the short run)
an allocation of desired values but
rather the attainment of desired
positions vis-a-vis other individuals
or groups. What is sought is a share
of the coercive abilities of the
government."(9)
This does not imply that *allocative* and
'positional* policies occur independently of one another,
rather that positional policies often determine the
outputs of allocative policy.

As positional policy

affects the ^structuring of influence", "coercion" as
pointed out by Lowi, becomes an integral "characteristic

(9)

Ibid.

p. 25.
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of those policies emanating from government structures."(10)

(3)

Policy-Making Structures
Having established the validity of positional

policy for policy analysis, Doern and Aucoin proceed to
examine the characteristics of policy-making structures
in the Diefenbaker, Pearson and Trudeau governments.
They contend that the preponderance of positional
policy, characteristic of the Trudeau period, has not
been an abrupt change in the policy process but rather
that there has been a gradual transition which has
occurred concomitantly with innovative policy and
programme management, as opposed simply to incremental
policy changes. Doern and Aucoin hasten to point out
however, that while the functions performed by the Prime
Minister*s Office, the Privy Council Office, the
Treasury Board and the Department of Finance have
expanded and differentiated, the roles of such executive
policy organs have not in themselves altered to a
significant extent.

The transition in the policy process

is indicated by the expansion, differentiation and
bureaucratization of the roles performed by these
offices in policy development.(11)

(10)
(11)

Ibid, p. 26.
Doern, G..Bruce. "The Development of Policy
Organizations in the Executive Arena", in G.
Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 41.
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The roles performed by the executive organs of
policy-making during the Diefenbaker government have
been catagorized as *fused*, 'passive* and * personalized*.
The * fused* aspect was a carry-over from the MacKenzie-King
period in that policy roles were largely accomplished by
the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, who was
also the Chairman of the Treasury Board.

The Prime

Minister*s Office was largely confined to housekeeping
tasks for the Prime Minister, although to the extent that
these partisan logistic activities affected some policy,
a P.M.O. "policy" role can be said to have been evident.(12)
The Privy Council Office played a relatively "passive"
function because staff shortages necessitated that
their activities be relegated to co-ordination and
secretarial roles in the service of the Cabinet.
Nonetheless, from time to time, the Secretary to the
Privy Council Office was consulted on policy matters, if
only infrequently.

The 'personalized* nature of policy

development was evidenced by the relationship between Mr.
Diefenbaker and R.B. Bryce as Secretary to the Cabinet.
Bryce is described as a *one man administrative gang*(13)
who enjoyed the flexibility and fusion of policy roles,
which characterized the Prime Minister*s Office and the Privy

(12)
(13)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 42.
p. 43.
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Council Office.

Bryce*s position was implemented by

the strongly control-oriented approach of the Deputy
Minister of Finance.

Thus financial matters were; "not

backed by the hand of fiscal philosophy that would
produce active initiative..."(14)
The Pearson era witnessed the * structural
differentiation* of policy-making organs.

The separation

of the Treasury Board from the Department of Finance,
the addition of Tom Kent as Mr. Pearson*s policy
adviser, and the introduction of the committee system
in the Privy Council Office, were a reflection of the new
managerial techniques advocated by the Glassco Commission.
The Pearson government also introduced the Science
Secretariat and the Special Planning Secretariat into
the Privy Council Office to deal with policy reviews
and innovative social policy.

The significance of such

structural changes resulting in increased differentiation
and specialization of policy inputs was that such
positional policies laid the groundwork for the programming,
planning and budgeting (P.P.B.S.)(15) approach of the
Trudeau government.
The role of policy-making organs in the Trudeau
government is viewed by Doern and Aucoin as differentiated,

(14)
(15)

Ibid,
Ibid.

p. 44.
pp. 47-57.
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bureaucratized and active. Such a characterization
emerges because of the rapid absorption of policy
advisors into the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy
Council Office. During Mr. Diefenbaker's tenure in
office and, to a lesser extent, during that of Mr. Pearson,
policy matters were brought to a full Cabinet, whereas
under Mr. Trudeau, the Cabinet is presented with policy
which has already been subject to scrutiny by one of
the sub-committees appended to the Privy Council Office.
Furthermore, the introduction of policy specialists,
under Pearson, has matured into a P.P.B.S. system
under Trudeau.

(4)

Unification of the Armed Forces:

Reasons

As stated in the introductory chapter, the issues
of unification have been dissected from numerous sources,
yet the greater proportion of such research has failed
to provide a satisfactory justification for unification,
at least within the context in which it occurred.

The

survey research conducted by Roddick Byers(l6) is
however, a notable and illuminating exception to this
trend.

(16)

Byers has focused upon the perceptions of

Byers, R.B., "Canadian Civil Military Relations
and Reorganization of the Armed Forces: Whither
Civilian Control", paper presented to the Canadian
Political Science Association in Winnipeg, 1970
(Kingston: Canadian Political Science Association,
1970).
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civilian control held by senior military officers and
has documented Mr. Hellyer*s trepidation as to the
reality of civilian control.

By and large however,

both proponents and adversaries of unification have
tended to concentrate upon essentially the same issues;
military efficiency, cost-effectiveness and service
tradition.

The intention of this section therefore is

critically to examine such arguments in order to
determine whether such explications are a sufficient
rationale for unification.
(a)

Allan, Kronenberg, Sherman
Gordon Allan*s thesis, The Bending of the

Sword(17) is, as the title would indicate, very much
opposed to unification.

Allan, while developing a

history of the structure of the Canadian forces from
Militia days, relies predominately upon the papers,
unpublished manuscripts, parliamentary testimony and
interviews with General Charles Foulkes. This
undoubtedly would explain, to some extent, the fact that
Allan*s thesis is generally consonant with the views held
by General Foulkes, particularly with reference to the
endemic frailties of a tri-service organization, but
nonetheless rejecting unification as the panacea for
such difficulties.

(17)

In delineating his thesis, however,

Allan, Gordon. The Bending of the Sword, unpublished
M.A. Thesis (Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 1971) .
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Allan adheres to the criticisms of unification in the
U.S. offered by Samuel Huntington that:
"Experts in military organization, often
argued that * unification* required either
the merger of the four services into a
single uniform or the abolition of the
service and the organization of the
Pentagon on a purely functional basis. The
former proposal however, was blindly Utopian
in rejecting the inevitability of pluralism,
and conceivably the latter could intensify
conflict to the point where it was
unbearable."(18)
Curiously, Allan appears not to have recognized that
Huntington was referring, not to *unification* but to
•integration* in accordance with the U.S. Reorganization
Act of 195&.

The unification to which the American

forces objected to so strenuously was not so much a
disagreement as regards policy-making among the defence
establishment, as it was a rejection of the service
priorities and resource allocations dictated by the
civilian administration.

Unification in the American

context then, was perceived as an infringement by the
civilian authority upon the military's ability to determine
its own priorities according to separate service
requirements.

Huntington further commented in a seeming

lament for pluralism and the demise of cherished
traditions that:

(18)

Huntington, Samuel. The Common Defense
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961)
p. 423.
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"Organizational permanence is the partner
of strategic flexibility...that the
castles of the services, like many of
their medieval counterparts, will remain
in existence, battered but unshaken,
long after the decisive battles, both
political and military, have shifted to
other fields."(19)
Vernon Kronenberg*s paper All Together Now(20)
is not so preoccupied as is

!!r. Allan*s, with the

precursors to unification, but rather is concerned, and
quite justifiably, with pre-judgments of unification
that were predicated upon previous attempts at integration
among support services.

The failings of integration

among support services were used as evidence to argue
against unification.

This was pursued however, without

giving sufficient recognition to the varying contexts
and requirements of headquarters, field and support
personnel.(21)
Kronenberg*s purpose was not to evaluate
unification per se but to consider the basic issues
involved and to trace the evolution of the programme at
the headquarters level.

In so doing, he

has noted that

(19) Ibid, p. 425.
(20) Kronenberg, V.J. All Together Now: The Organization
of the Department of National Defence in Canada
1964-1972. previously written as an M.A. thesis at
Carleton University, subsequently published in the
Weliesley Papers (Toronto: Canadian Institute for
International Affairs, 1973).
(21) Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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unification has proceeded through three distinct
stages; integration, functional command and unification.
The elimination of the separate service chiefs, the
establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff and the
integration of support organizations resulted in force
integration, but the question remained as to how the
commands would become operational.)
'Functional* command(22) was originally introduced
into the services, but because Canada possessed
relatively few military personnel to protect an immense
territory, functional command was necessarily tempered
with geographical considerations.

Interestingly enough,

the nature of the functional-geographical debate gave
rise to disagreement among the land, sea and air elements
as to their particular requirements.

The army*s

position was that neither a strictly functional nor
regional command structure

was

appropriate and

therefore sought a compromise solution.

Later however,

they preferred functional command while allowing certain
regional modifications, for example, control over
militia contingents.

The Royal Canadian Air Force

(R.C.A.F.) insisted upon strict functional command
because they felt that geographical organization under

(22)

Functional command refers to a task-orientation
of service roles, which may combine all three
service elements under a single hierarchy.
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a single commander responsible for all services would
hamper flexibility and be economically deleterious.
The navy appeared unusually quiet throughout these events,
presumably content in the knowledge that Maritime
Command would remain relatively unmolested.

After

several changes in organization, the eleven service
commands were reduced to six functional commands, and
the NATO contingents brought directly under headquarters.(
Those who opposed unification were seen by
Kronenberg as belonging to one of two groups. The
*traditionalists* bemoaned the loss of their identity
and their uniforms which, so it was said, would make
them the laughing stock and *virtual pariahs*(24) in
naval circles.

They also argued that this arrangement

would prove difficult during combined allied operations.
Those who presented their case from the strategic point
of view however, could make a solid case against
unification in that operational roles (management,
logistics, training and actual combat) among the services
have distinct characteristics^ Kronenberg correctly
states however, that such arguments:
"were largely beside the point...The aim
of unification was not to sweep aside
these facts of operational life, but to

(23)

Ibid,

pp. 68-70.

(24)

Ibid.

p. 81.
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organize the forces so that operations
could come under unitary control."(25)
Michael Sherman, currently with the Hudson
Institute, has critically examined unification relative
to its espoused aims in 1964. Sherman states that while
the integration phase has undoubtedly produced economic
advantages, Hellyer's much heralded 25 per cent budget
allotment for new capital equipment fell short
of its objectives. In addition, he questioned the
wisdom of administrative efficiency which posited the
Chief of Defence Staff as the sole, formal military
channel to the Minister.

In essence, however, Sherman's

appraisal of the integration phase is positive, but he
retains misgivings about unification, citing the
concerns of senior staff about the pace at which
unification was being pursued.

Through the examination

of Canada's defence commitments, Sherman argues that
the benefits of integration are themselves sufficient
and that unification is unnecessary and possibly
damaging to the services. He concludes that:
"the single-service conclusion would seem
to follow only if the nation's military
responsibilities were so specialized that
all fighting elements were related to
all others...some combat functions will
have as little to do with others, as say,
anti-submarine warfare and peacekeeping."(26)

(25) Ibid,

p. 80.

(26) Sherman, M.
"A Single Service for Canada" in
the Adelphi Papers. (London: Institute for
Strategic Studies, 19671 No. 39, P- 9.
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The difficulty with the fore-mentioned studies
is that they concentrate almost exclusively upon
unification, its merits and demerits, in the absence
of perceiving unification as a part of the political
process; it is therefore necessary to explore other
factors which may have influenced unification.

(b) Operational Effectiveness
( While the detractors of unification have argued
that the elimination of the three services has had
undesirable effects, there is nonetheless, agreement
that 'combined operations* composed of land, sea and
air elements, are fundamental to modern military
strategy.

Unification would as a consequence, bring

about equipment standardization and 'support* service
integration.

These factors would uphold the thesis that

modern 'conventional* warfare is indivisible and that
it is both anachronistic and redundant to allow for the
existence of three services, at least, at the headquarte
level.

It could therefore be reasoned that unification,

not just integration,(27) would be the only logical
conclusion./ John Gellner has stated that the separation

(27)

Integration unifies the services at the Chiefs of
Staff level while retaining separate services;
unification merges the services into one unit
having a single hierarchy throughout the command
structure.
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of service elements was self-defeating beginning with
the advent of steam power.(28)
"There can be little doubt that theoretically
one service is best. It is also the
obvious solution because the historical
reasons that did exist for a division have
either disappeared, as in the case of the
separation of sea and land warfare, or
have never been valid, as is the
separation of air from sea and land
warfare."(29)
The concern of Canadian officers over the
condition of the armed forces after World War II and over
management by committee was exemplified by the
scathing criticisms of Major-General W.H.S. Macklin:
"Canada*s armed forces are completely
uncoordinated and incapable of providing
this country with an adequate defence.
The overall defence organization is
chaotic. The armed forces cannot act
in any operation of war, there is no
policy or plan to use them in combination."(30)
Citing the reorganization of the Canadian forces in 1946,
Major-General Macklin stated that:
"the principle of unity of direction was
thrown out with the garbage. The dead
weight of outworn sentiment masquerading
as tradition, and the influences of
vested interests within the services

(28)

Gellner, John. Lecture Notes, University of
Toronto, 1974.

Gellner, John. "Service Unification in Canada"
in Military Review, April (Fort Leavenworth:
United States Army Command and General Staff
College, 1967)' p. 6.
(30) Macklin, Major-General W.H.S. "Claims Canada*s Forces
Completely Uncoordinated", in Montreal Daily Star
March 20, 1959*

(29)

- 32 -

and in the civil service and industry
carried the fie Id. "(3D
In 1958, an editorial in the Halifax Chronicle Herald
summed up the issue of committee rule fairly well:
"there must be one military man who
wields absolute military authority.
Co-operation works only when there
exists a competent commander willing
to knock the heads together of those
who do not co-operate."(32)
There were thus sound military reasons for
unification or, at least for the abolition of the totally
unwieldy committee system, which integration would
accomplish.

Many officers of course, recalling the

difficulties incurred through previous integration
attempts were reluctant to pursue with unification but
the adherents of unification replied with the
observation that:
"integration has been tried before and
has not worked. Co-operation has
been continually called for, but so
many examples exist of attempts at
integration failing that the obvious
conclusion is that it is a delusion...
What is called for is a formal marriage...
the centrifugal influence apparent in
all members of a group of sister services

(31)

Macklin, Major-General W.H'iS.' "Unify Our Three
Services*, in Montreal Daily boar, September 22,
1956.

(32)

Editorial, "United Armed Forces or Chaos", in
Halifax Chronicle Herald, August 15, 1958.
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sooner or later to the collapse
of attempts at integration"(33)

(c) /Nationalism)
Canadian resistance to domination by Imperial
fiat has left an indelible imprint on the seemingly
relentless Canadian passion for affirming her
identityJ In a military context, nationalist
aspirations became particularly acute in two situations,
the Army of Occuption in Europe, and the Suez crisis.
As early as 1943, the Canadian government
was approached by the British as to Canada*s
participation in the post-war settlement and policing
duties.

External Affairs insisted that Canadian

participation be linked directly to a voice in post-war
decision-making.

It was felt that Canada's

participation should depend not only upon her potential
role in occupation but also upon her actual contribution
to the defeat of Germany.

The opinion of the

British was expressed by Lord Halifax, British
ambassador to Washington, that contrary to Canadian

(33)

Emmott, N.W. "The Case for Canadian Military
Unification", in Air Force and Space Digest
(Washington: Air Force Association, 1967)
pp. 78-80.
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desires, Commonwealth policy must be a policy of
unity.(34)
Prime Minister Mackenzie King sharply disagreed
with Lord Halifax, asserting .that his statements came:
"like a shot out of the blue, like
a conspiracy on the part of the
imperialists to win their own victory
in the middle of the war."(35)
Mackenzie King strongly urged that colonial policy be
replaced by 'functionalisra* through which:
"those countries which have most to
contribute to the maintenance of
peace should be most frequently
selected for positions on international organization."(36)
General MacNaughton, the Minister of National Defence,
emphatically supported Mackenzie- King in his opposition
to Canadian troops being used as a colonial force. Such
support as General MacNaughton's was widespread, including
that of the Canadian Institute of International

(34)

(35)
(36)

Kasurak, P.C. "Pawn in the Game of National
Politics: Origins and Fortunes of the
Canadian Army Occupation Force 1943-1946" in
Canadian Defence Quarterly (Toronto: Defence
Publications Ltd., 1975). Fall 1975. No page
references are available since the quotations
were taken from the publisher's galley sheets.'
Kasurak's article will be published in October,
1975. This applies to footnotes 34-38.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Affairs and Lester B. Pearson, who stated in
reference to Canadian control of defence and foreign
policy that:
"in fact...we have no such powers and so
far as policy and planning in this war
are concerned, our status is little
better than that of a colony."(37)
Canada's aspirations continued to be rebuffed at the
San Francisco Conference and at the United Nations
Commission for Europe.

Field Marshall Montgomery*s

statement that a Canadian brigade could serve as
Commonwealth *window dressing*(38) hardly served to
popularize pro-British sentiment.

Canadian troops were

subsequently returned to Canada.
The Suez crisis provided a second strident
example of Britain's refusal to acknowledge nationalist
sentiment in Canada.

The British and French had

simultaneously informed their allies of their intention
to issue an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, meanwhile the
ultimatum itself had already been delivered.

The

invasion which followed shortly thereafter created an
embittered response from Canada.

As James Eayrs has

indicated, Britain did neither inform nor consult with
her allies because:
"to invite such opinion would be to
invite disapproval so stern as to

(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid.

make it difficult, if not impossible,
to carry out the policy".(39)
While stated government response was not nearly so
vociferous as might be anticipated, Mr. Pearson stressed
that, Canada was not, "a colonial chore-boy running
around shouting ready, Aye ready."(40)
Further embarrassment for Canada, and
particularly for Mr. Pearson, occurred when the
Canadian contingent for the United Nations Emergency
Force was rejected by the Egyptians. They apparently
were perplexed as to the reason why the Queen's Own
Rifles were replacing the Queen's own troops in Suez.
As Pearson has noted, however, the Queen's Own Rifles
were the only choice because:
"it appeared that our only alternative to
the regiment in question was The Black
Watch! What we needed was the First East
Kootenay Anti-imperialistic Rifles."(41)
The significance of the Suez crisis for unification
was that, firstly, the identification of the Queens Own
Rifles as 'British' troops by the Egyptians was
humiliating to Pearson, under whose administration
unification eventually came about.

(39)

As Galloway has

Eayrs, James Canada in World Affairs October 1955
to June 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961)
"p. 1^4.
(40) Ibid, p. 185.
(41) Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt.Hon.
Lester B. Pearson, 1948-19^1 (Toronto: New American
Library of Canada, 1973) Vol. 2, p. 296.
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observed:
"Lester Pearson's offer was rejected,
and in this rejection was born the
idea of a need for a Canadian military
machine which would be unmistakingly
Canadian."(42)
Secondly, Suez signalled the end of the anachronistic
concept of 'colonial troops' as Canada sought to define
her own defence priorities, that is:
"the Pearson vision of a highly mobile
group of Canadian peacekeepers cracking
around the world like Superman."(43)
Thirdly, Suez demonstrated that if Canada was to have
such a highly mobile force, the three services could not
hope to accomplish the task.(44)

Furthermore, it has

been argued by Richard Ross that indeed the desire for
a highly mobile force was Hellyer*s fundamental intent
in unification as well as rendering the forces less
likely to be 'appendaged' by the British.(45)

(d)

The Glassco Commission
The Glassco Commission was the catalyst for the

reorganization of the Canadian forces. It revealed, in

(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)

Galloway, Strom. "The Search for a Defence Policy
in Canada", in Army Quarterly, Vol. 101, No. 5,
(Devon: West of London Press, 1971). p. 289.
Ibid, p. 290.
Ibid, p. 290Ross, Richard. A Paradigm in Defence Organization:
Unification of tine Canadian Armed "Forces, (Fort Lee:
U.S. Army Logistics Management Centre, 1969).
pp. 21-27.
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addition to a reappraisal of Canada*s defence
committments, three areas of concern, (a)the ratio of
manpower to equipment purchases, (b)the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, and (c)civilian control over the services.
Consequently, it provided for the forthcoming White
Paper on Defence under the directorship of Paul Hellyer,
Minister of National Defence.
For several years prior to 1963, Canada had been
able to maintain a virtual ceiling on defence expenditures,
however, this had been accomplished through the adjustment
of manpower to equipment purchases.

It was observed that

if this trend continued, by the late 1960*s all of the
defence budget would be absorbed by manpower costs alone.
As Air Marshal Sharp pointed out:
"Unless something was done we would price
ourselves out of existence."(46)
The Glassco Commission therefore sought to reduce
expenditures in manpower.

It was recognized that since

Canadian defence committments were linked operationally
to collective security measures, and would hence be under
control of these commands (SACLANT, SACEUR, NATO), the
situation would be that:
"the principal function of the headquarters
organization...(would be) one of support

(46)

Gellner, J. "Service Unification in Canada"
op. cit. p. 4.
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rather than operational command; to
direct and regulate the manning,
training, arming, supplying and
accomodating the Armed Forces."(47)
While the commissioners recognized that the forms of
support activity would vary among the services, they
also realized that the growth of technology common to
all three services made division among support services
redundant.(4^)

In research and development also, the

commissioners reported that:
"In this area, as in many others, the
traditional independence of the three
services gives rise to duplication
and waste."(49)
The Glassco Commission found serious fault with
the organization of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CS.C.)
and with the severely circumscribed role of its
Chairman (C£QS>). The CS.C. was governed by unanimous
decision since proposals were not voted upon, nor did
the C.C.O.S. have any overriding authority. Hence:
"the effectiveness of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee is, to a large extent,
dependent on the personal qualities of
its members, each of whom has a virtual
veto in its deliberations."(50)
Decision-making was further complicated by the fact there
already existed 200 standing tri-service committees and

(47) Glassco Commission Vol. 4, January 21, 1963. p. 66.
48
Ibid, p. 66.
(49) TEia. pp. 67-68.
(50) Ibid, p. 70.
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approximately 400 committees of a temporary, taskoriented nature.

The Glassco Commission quite correctly

stated that the committee system :
"permits procrastination, and the absence
of a single commanding voice may spell
the difference between success or
failure in any matter of joint concern
to the three services."(51)
In reference to the C.C.O.S., the commissioners
recognized that if executive authority were placed
squarely on the shoulders of the C.C.O.S., there was the
possibility of * excessive concentration* of authority
within his advisory task. , This could have had
dangerous implications in light of the C.C.0.S.*s
responsibility as the Canadian representative to N.A.T.O.,
as chairman of the Ranks Structure Committee, and as a
member of the Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence and
the Cabinet Defence Committee. Nonetheless, the C.C.0.S.*s
lack of authority was viewed as an explicit liability in
his functions pertaining to the coordination of training
and operations conducted by the services.
Under such conditions, each service chief was
responsible for the control and administration of his
service branch; thus, the C.C.0.S.*s only resort was his
persuasiveness with the service chief involved or,
failing this, his influence with the Minister.(52)

(51)
(52)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 70.
p. 73.
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The third aspect of the commissioners study to
be found wanting, was in relationship to the role of
the Deputy Minister and the extent of civilian control.
While a Minister*s powers enable him to delegate
whatever authority to his Deputy as he may desire,
established practice, since the Deputy is not accountable
to the House, is that the Deputy Minister*s will * affect'
the carrying through of established policy, during the
course of which he may exercise his discretion.

This

meant that the Deputy Minister*s role in policy
development was very limited by virtue of the fact that
necessary manpower was not available to adequately assess
proposals submitted to his office.

The Glassco Commission

concluded that the role of the Deputy Minister be
expanded, so as to assist the Minister and participate
more actively in the administration of the armed forces.
As indicated by the Glassco Commission, the absence of
such civilian advice imperilled civilian control.
"The Minister may rely primarily on the
Chiefs of Staff Committee for advice
and on questions of military effectiveness
it is natural that he should do so; but
the military character of this group
raises doubts as to the reality of civilian
control if the minister places excessive
reliance upon it.
There is a need for a strong staff
group which is essentially civilian in
character, outside the framework of
management of the Armed Forces."(53)

(53)

Ibid.

p.

76.
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Because of the sprawling complexity of
administration and the plethora of committees within
the Ministry, the Glassco Commission also noted that
the multiplicity of channels to the Minister meant that
it was an extraordinarily difficult task to exercise
effective control over the services. It was therefore
implicit in the commissioner's recommendations that
an essentially civilian organization, through the
Deputy Minister's office, be available to ensure such
control over administration policy.
/

/Undoubtedly, the growth of nationalism and the
concommitant rejection of colonial fiats, the imbalance
between manpower and equipment costs, the multifarious
organizational iniquities of the tri-service system
and the necessity for operational efficacy, were all
contributory justifications for the reorganization of
the Department of National Defence; but were they
sufficient justification to proceed with unification?
Operational efficacy, while it was argued that unification
was the irrevocable corollary to integration, may well
have suffered because of the schism produced between the
military and the civilian authority.

The high cost of

manpower relative to the resources available for new
equipment could have been adumbrated through more
stringent procurement and accounting procedures or by
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further attempts at logistics integration.(54)

The

nationalist aspect, could surely have been appeased
by far less controversial measures, perhaps by
emphasizing the realignment of defence priorities and
the global peacekeeper role.

The Glassco Commission*s

findings, provided not so much a rationale for
unification as they did for integration.

The

commissioners had indeed explicitly rejected unification
because of the diversity of operational roles.(55)

If

such explanations are unsatisfactory, what then, of
civilian control?

(5) Civilian Control as a Concept
When analyzing civil-military relations in a
nation having strong, democratic institutions such as
Canada, surrealistic images of despotic military juntas
can be dispensed with; civilian control over the military
is not described in terms of a threat to constitutional
authority.

(54)

As Michael Howard has pointed out, in a both

Paul Hellyer stresses that because of the lack of
executive authority in the CS.C. and because of
the multiplicity of channels to the Minister, the
Chiefs of Staff would refuse to make priority
judgments. Interview with Mr. Hellyer OJD. cit.
August 29, 1975.
(55) Glassco Commission, op_0 cit. p. 64.
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•orderly and peaceful* society:
"military leaders are no longer suspected
of nurturing Caesarist ambitions.
Indeed, the armed forces constitute only
a part of the national organization for
defence and are entirely dependent upon
the civil, industrial and scientific
organization for their power."(56)
Furthermore, Howard argues that the degree of empathy
between the civilian and military authority is dependent
not upon the acquisition of power, but rather upon
priorities defined in terms of resource management.(57)
Howard*s contention is an obvious one; the
accelerating costs of increasingly sophisticated weapons
technology and the expansion of the defence budget
relative to the Gross National Product, result in
competition with civilians for resource allocations.
This competition for resources (particularly in
the United States) contributes substantially to the
character of civil-military relations. Howard*s thesis
however, is so readily apparent that it becomes axiomatic,
and consequently does not offer a sufficient explanation
of the exigencies of civilian control over the military.
Civilian control does not refer merely to the potential
for the usurpation of democratic processes nor to th.e'
avaricious consumption of resources.

(56) Howard, M. (ed) "The Armed Forces as a Political
Problem", in Soldiers and Governments (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1957). p. 16 .
(57) Ibid, p. 13.
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Samuel Huntington*s analysis of civilian
control is more fruitful; he suggests that military
policy is comprised of three elements: military security
(external threat); internal security (subversion);
situational security (long range estimation of economic,
social and demographic changes potentially damaging to
the state).

Each policy type has both an operational

and institutional component.

The operational element he

describes as pertaining to the size, organization and
utilization of the armed forces,while at the same time
being responsible for the resources required for military
purposes.(58)

Operations* policy then, upon which

Howard had concentrated his attention, consists "of the
immediate means taken to meet the security threat,"(59)
whereas * institutional policy* deals with the manner in
which operational policy is formulated and executed.(60)
The * institutional* element then, becomes of paramount
importance, for while, as Huntington states, public
debate usually emphasizes the *operational* aspect: "in
the long run the nature of the decision on these issues is
determined by the institutional pattern through which
the decisions are made."(61)

(58)

/

Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State
(New York: Viritage Books, 1964). p. 3.
(59) Ibid. p. 1.
(60) Ibid. p . 1.
(61) Ibid, p. 2.

- 46 -

Huntington*s study was predicated on his
insistence that ideally, civil-military relations be
constructed so as to allow for the maximization of
security without jeopardizing prevalent social values.
He is thus arguing for what he has termed *objective
civilian control* through permitting optimal military
professionalism,while restraining * subjective civilian
control*, or the *civilianizing* of the military.(62)
In brief, he stated that the:
"essence of objective civilian control is
the recognition of an autonomous military
professionalism; the essence of subjective
civilian control is the denial of an
independent military sphere. Historically
the demand for objective control has come
from the military profession, the demand
for subjective control from the multifarious
civilian groups anxious to maximize their
power in military affairs."(63)
Huntington*s argument does not suggest the
desirability of the military clamouring for political
participation, rather he argues that the more professional
the military becomes, that is, the greater their autonomy,
their credibility as a political force is dissipated
because they would have been neutralized.

Subjective

civilian control conversely, would presuppose a conflict
of interest between civilian authority and military
security resulting in a situation where the prerequisites

C62)
(63)

Ibid,
Ibid,

pp. 80-85pp. 83-84.
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of military security are deemed to erode civilian
control.(64)

Thus Huntington, both in his attitude

towards unification (which was entirely negative) and
in his preferences for an 'autonomous military sphere*,
has underlined his pluralist conception of policy-making
and the military establishments role in it.

(6)

Civilian Control and the Armed Forces in Canada
In Canada, however, successive goverments have

been reluctant to allow for such an autonomous military
prerogative; in fact, the Canadian military has repeatedly
paid homage, at least verbally, to the sacrosanct tenets
of civilian supremacy.

Air Vice Marshal M.M. Hendrick

has stated that:
"We are by tradition an anonymous group...
It was not our business to worry about
politics; we left that to our Minister,
and to our civilian heads. We also had a
feeling...of confidence that our judgments,
our advice and our technical know-how would
be given due consideration by our political
masters...
If it was overruled...it was for reasons of
economy, economics, politics, strategy or
some other overriding reason for which the
military factors had to be subordinated.
Of course, none of us would take any quarrel
with this whatever."(65)
The seeming acquiescence of the military to the concept of
civilian supremacy has led some defence commentators,

(64) Ibid, pp. 83-84.
(65) Byers, R. ojo. cit. pp. 3-4.
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such as James Eayrs, to conclude that the;"principle
of civilian supremacy has been firmly built into the
institutions of which post-war defence policy is
made."(66)

Roddick Byers notes that:

"it has generally been accepted that a
fairly high degree of civilian control
operated in Canada. Furthermore, the
prevailing pattern of civilian-military
relations seemed to approximate the
anti-military ideology, low political
powers,and high military professionalism
ideal type suggested by S. Huntington."(67)
The ostensibly halcyon days of civil-military
relations in Canada however, were periodically shattered
when the military exceeded its jurisdiction in the
determination and carrying-out of defence policy. Such
events could occur because governments, while exercising
civilian control defined in terms of institutional
supremacy, did not sufficiently undertake civilian
direction except on those occasions when they sought to
retrieve their authority after the military had
exceeded theirs.
Civilian control therefore has two aspects:

L-

(a) the government as final arbiter of defence policy, and
(b) as active participant in the military establishment.
As Professor Byers has stated*, "without some civilian
direction, the degree of control is bound to suffer."(68)

(66) Ibid.
(67) Ibid,
(68) Ibid,

p. 1.
p. 10.
p. 5.
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During the Second World War, the established
practices of Canadian civil-military relations were
demonstrably at odds with those of the Americans. As
James Eayrs has emphasized, the American military was
largely responsible for the conduct of their own policy
and strategy, whereas, in Canada, Mackenzie King was
inexorably absorbed in the Canadian war effort.(69)
Although Mackenzie King was confident in General
MacNaughton*s military capabilities, General MacNaughton's
discretionary powers were nonetheless limited by the
Prime Minister.

Mackenzie King was most indignant when

informed that General MacNaughton had committed troops
to take part in a British operation in Norway without his
prior consultation or consent. During the preparations
for Operation Husky in the Italian campaign, Mackenzie
King's decision to send troops was due in part to his
concern that unless Canada participated directly in the
campaign, the nation would have less influence in post-war
deliberations.(70)
A striking example of the differences between the
Canadian and American civil-military relations occurred
when the Americans requested Canadian troops for an assault
upon Japanese positions in the Aleutian Islands. U.S.

(69)

Eayrs, James. The Art of the Possible (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1961) pp. 75-76.

(70)

Ibid,

pp. 81-82.
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General DeWitt approached Major General Pearkes
(later destined to be Defence Minister under Mr.
Diefenbaker) as to the possibility of Canadian
assistance.

General Pearkes 'did not report this

discussion to the Prime Minister.

Later General Pope

(Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in
Washington) discussed the proposal with U.S. Secretary
Hickerson.

General Pope then raised the issue with

Lieutenant-General Stuart who advised him to contact
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C Marshall.
Subsequently, General Marshall dispatched General DeWitt
to confer with General Pearkes as to the necessary
arrangements for the invasion.

All of this was carried

out by General Pearkes without communicating his
intentions to the Prime Minister.

This then, was a

conspicuous violation of established practice.

General

Pearkes was particularly adroit in this regard(71) and
before Mackenzie King knew what was happening, Pearkes
had not only agreed to the proposal but had already
despatched troops to the Aleutians.(72)
Mackenzie King was furious that Canada was
involved in any military operation with the United States
without his consent. He insisted that any such involvement

(71) During the interview with Mr. Paul Hellyer he
claimed to be unaware of the Aleutian incident.
Hellyer Interview op_. cit.
(72) Eayrs, James. op_. cit. p. 94.

- 51 -

must be preceded by overtures from the State Department
to himself, the War Committee of Cabinet, and the
Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralston.
General Pope was then- sent to see Mr. Hickerson
to express the Prime Minister's criticism of the way
the military had proceeded.

Upon his arrival in

Washington, General Pope was promptly informed that if:
"Canada wanted a Stimson to Ralston
invitation to collaborate...(Pope
should) forget whatever Calvinistic
tendencies there might be in (the
Canadian) system and not set out in
an attempt to reform U.S. Army
procedure."(73)
v Such incidents as those in Italy and the Aleutians
serve to indicate the greater degree of supervision
actively undertaken by the Canadian government in the
conduct of military operations. Yet another crisis
arose which was of even greater political significance.
Mackenzie King had always regarded the conscription
issue with some trepidation, because of the strongly
anti-conscriptionist mood of Quebec.

The rate of

attrition in Europe however, meant that voluntary
enlistment would no longer sustain the strength of the
forces required.

This led to a breach of confidence,

between the government

and the military officers, during

which General Pearkes was again to become a central figure.

(73)

Ibid.

pp. 84-85.
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Upon learning that Mackenzie King fully
intended to continue with volunteer recruits rather
than conscription, General Pearkes attempted to pressure
the government, releasing his' opinions to the press.
Mackenzie King warned that:
"That looks like the Army against the
civil power. These men in uniform
have no right to speak in ways which
will turn the people against civil
power."(74)
Shortly thereafter, several senior officers delivered
a memorandum to General MacNaughton, now the Minister
of National Defence, declaring that voluntary
recruitment was insufficient.

In effect, this was an

ultimatum to the government, that unless conscription
was immediately set in motion, mass resignations would
occur among the Army High Command.

In the face of such

desparate events as having the resignation of officers
during wartime, Mackenzie King yielded to military
pressure and conscription began.(75)

(7) Summary
The implications of such instances of civilmilitary conflict were firstly, during the course of war
operations the military had exceeded their discretionary
powers, whereas during the Aleutian Islands issue, the

(74)
(75)

Ibid,
Ibid.

p. 93.
p. 94.
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military had entered into
(^

defence agreements without

the prior consultation with the government. During
conscription, the military had premeditatedly sought
to impose their will upon the'civilian authority.
Dangerous precedents indeed, at the threshold of the
nuclear era.
In the years following the war, the destructive
capabilities of nuclear weapons and the subsequent
introduction of long range delivery systems, coupled
with the cold war and the realignment of collective
defence measures meant that in future the distinction
between military and civilian strategic decisions could
not be so clearly differentiated.

As Eayrs has pointed

out:
"The result in Canada, as in all Western
nations, was to compel senior military
officers to exercise judgment in areas
far beyond their traditional competence."(76)
Interestingly enough, Eayrs remains convinced as
to the reality of civilian control and argues his case by
means of illustrating the extent of civilian membership
within the defence establishment.

To support his view

he cites the composition of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee; this would include the Deputy Minister for
National Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs, a member of the Defence

(76

>

Ibid.

P. 94.
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Research Board, and periodically, the attendance of
External Affairs people on the Joint Intelligence
Committee and the Joint Planning Committee.

Eayrs

incorrectly assumes that such, a 'body-count* of
civilians would illustrate adequate civilian control.
It was however, precisely the composition of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee and the effectiveness of the Deputy
Minister*s role which caused such grave concern to the
Glassco Commission as to the reality of civilian control.
Furthermore, despite the civilian membership within the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was the military*s
influence which had prevented the European members of
N.A.T.O. from participation along northern radar
positions,(77) and General Foulkes, who as Chairman of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was instrumental in
'stampeding* Canada into NORAD.
Despite Professor Eayrs assurances to the
contrary, the extent of civilian control over the military
cannot be determined merely by a cursory enumeration of
participants. What is required is that those participants
have sufficient capability, through access to civilian
v
sources of policy advice, to evaluate the proposals

v

before them so as to provide not only civilian control but
also direction over defence policy.

(77)

Ibid,

p. 97-
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The implications of this chapter are that
(a) policy outputs are not necessarily dependent
variables differentiated only by subject matter,
(b) policy both affects and is effected by policymaking apparatus itself, (c) policy effects the
structuring of influence within the policy-making
process. With reference to defence, there existed a
demonstrable need for the assertion of civilian control,
that is, for a restructuring of influence, which
integration, while ameliorating the substantive issues,
could not accomplish. Only through unification, with
&>he

imposition upon the military of an authoritative,

Minified central hierarchy having expanded sources of
civilian input, could the civilian authority ensure
civilian control and direction of the armed forces.
The following chapter, utilizing Doern and
Aucoin*s typology of policy-making, explores the
relationship between the policy-making process and the
determination of defence policy during Mr. Diefenbaker*s
term of office.

The research suggests that the sterility

of the policy-making apparatus, that is, the absence of
civilian input into defence issues coupled with the
Prime Minister's reluctance to develop long-range policy
objectives, undoubtedly led to the defence debacle in
which Mr. Diefenbaker found himself.

/

v.
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Chapter II: The Diefenbaker Period:
Incrementalist Policy Inputs
As G. Bruce Doern has stated, the roles of policymaking organizations, "are derived from the logic of
their functional input into policy"(l); the same
criterion applies tothe utilization of other policy
inputs such as royal commissions, White Papers, task
forces, and advisory councils. As noted earlier, the
expansion and differentiation of policy-making organizations;
"has transformed the central machinery from a fused,
personalized and primarily passive instrument of policy
development to that of a relatively more differentiated
bureaucratized and active one."(2)

In essence, the

characterization of policy-making organizations within
the Diefenbaker government as * fused, personalized and
passive*, means that innovative, programme-output oriented
policy did not develop and as a consequence policy was
determined incrementally.

This condition was evident not

only at the executive level, but was also descriptive of
the uses to which additional forms of policy inputs were
applied, such as royal commissions.
The implications for defence policy were of great

(1) Doern, G.Bruce "Policy Organizations in the
Executive Arena", G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin
op. cit. p. 41*
(2) Ibid, pp. 41-42.
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significance as well because such an incrementalist
approach, in the absence of definitive, innovative policy
resulted in Diefenbaker being unable to cope with the
pressing issues of defence.

His vacillation on the

matter of acquiring nuclear armaments led to the
collapse of his government. Such defence policy
quandaries however, were not endemic solely to the
Conservatives, rather they were, as John McLin has argued,
inherited from the Liberals. Mr. Diefenbaker therefore
is not entirely culpable for creating such critical
issues for defence policy as he was for his inability
to make significant departures from on-going policy.(3)
Not surprisingly, the absence of sources of
policy initiative, coupled with an incrementalist and
•redistributive* policy orientation could, and in fact,
did result, in the military exercizing excessive
influence in the determination of defence policy.

This

was accomplished largely through the efforts of General
Pearkes, Minister of National Defence and General Foulkes,
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who embarked
upon policy initiatives clearly beyond their jurisdiction
due the absence of adequate civilian direction.

(3) Doern, B. Bruce and Aucoin, P.

op_. cit. p. 7.
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(1) The Machinery of Policy
As a policy-maker, Diefenbaker sought to
identify himself in the mould of a contemporary
MacDonald, reconciling disparate regional groups and
fending off the encroachments of Bay Street and
bureaucrats in the civil service. As a result,
communications between executive and the civil service
ground to a halt and the Prime Minister gathered around
himself not skilled administrators but instead, as
Newman has described, a "feckless crew of political
hangers on"(4) whose sole purpose was to indulge the
Prime Minister*s political aspirations.
Policy-making was reduced to a * brokerage
incrementalism*(5) as a reaction to the G.N.P. approach
of the Liberals. Redistributive policy was the order
of the day as Mr. Diefenbaker:
"tried to appropriate to himself the cry
from every underdeveloped sector of the
country*s population, a cry not for
charity or special privleges, but for
an equalization of opportunity within
the Canadian Confederation."(o)

(4)

Newman, P.C. Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker
Years, (Toronto: McClelland and Stuart, 1963). p.
(5) Doern, G. Bruce. "Policy Organizations in the
Executive Arena" p_£. cit. p. 45.
(6) Newman, P.C op_. cit. p. 190.
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When questioned as to his opinion of the Glassco
Commission*s recommendations, he retorted;"That*s
wrong. We*re not running the government like a big
business corporation."(7)

Policy outputs then, were

not programmes but rather government handouts designed
to cultivate electoral support.(8)
As indicated earlier, the policy input of the
P.M.O. and the P.CO. were relatively benign,
preoccupied as they were with housekeeping under the
tutelage of the * chief*.

Newman states flatly that the

Cabinet was "a mixture of patriotic radicals and
weak-kneed reactionaries,"(9) and "waiters on Providence,
men who shared his tastes and prejudices, but not his
breadth of outlook or patriotic zeal."(10)

There were

of course exceptions, notably Davie Fulton and Donald
Fleming, but Fulton as Minister of Justice resigned
when it became clear to him that Mr. Diefenbaker was
much more adept at chastizing the Liberals rather than
developing concrete policy objectives. The final blow
came when Mr. Diefenbaker reversed his position in the
Columbia River Treaty.(11)

Fleming, as Minister of

Finance, vainly attempted to balance the budget amidst

(7) Ibid, p. 193.
(8) Doern, G. Bruce "Policy Organizations in the
Executive Arena". op_. cit. p. 45.
(9) Newman, p.C oj>. cit. p. 92.
(10) Ibid, p. 97.
(11) Ibid, pp. 118-120.
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the overtly political spending of his peers. He was
often not even informed of forthcoming important
expenditures and was frequently overruled in
Cabinet.(12)

The plight of Fleming and Fulton was the

rule rather than the exception; in Cabinet, Mr.
Diefenbaker:
"acted as if he were the silent
partner in every cabinet minister*s
office. He ignored the normal
delegation of authority and attempted
to operate the federal adminis tration
through personal prerogative."(13)
Consequently, the potential for policy inputs were
sharply curtailed, with the Prime Minister regarding
expert opinion as incursions into the sanctuary of his
office.
In matters of finance, the Treasury Board was
directly under the auspices of the Department of
Finance, there was no appreciable differentiation of
roles.

If, as Doern suggests, the classical budgetary

system was control-oriented and concerned with the
overall effects of government spending,(14) this
characteristic was even more acute under Fleming because
he approached the budget as a clerk, rejecting the
Keynesian thesis and failing to comprehend how the

(12) Ibid, p. 92.
(13) Ibid. p. 92.
(14) Doern, G. Bruce. "The Budgetary Process and the
Policy Role of the Federal Bureaucracy" in
G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. pp. 80-81.

- 61 -

economy could be manipulated or stimulated through
government taxation and spending.(15)

As Doern points

out, the classical budgetary process meant that "future
policies and budgets became mere linear extensions of
the past",(16) devoid of either outputs or programmes
which were anything but incrementally derived handouts.
This was of course of critical importance during debates
over the A.V. Roe Arrow.
Significantly, other sources of policy input,
apart from those at the executive level, were also of
limited impact. White Papers, which had already
demonstrated their utility in Britain by 1945 for
testing Parliamentary opinion, were used in Canada
primarily as an information tool, that is, they were
used to provide information on government policy which
had already been established, rather than for policy
development.

The roles of White Papers were changed

considerably during Pearson*s tenure as a means to
facilitate discussion on future policy.(17)
The extensive use of"Royal Commissions'^ sixteen
in all) by the Diefenbaker government can be attributed
to a variety of reasons, not the least of which may be.
that they were instituted because the government had
no policy of its own.

The use of "royal commissions"in

(15) Newman, P.C. p_p_. cit. pp. 125-27.
(16) Doern, G.B. in "The Budgetary Process and the Policy
Role of the Federal Bureaucracy". op_. cit. p. 83.
(17) Doern, A.D., "The Role of White PapersrrT~in G. Bruce
Doern and P. Aucoin OJD. cit. pp. 180-L82.
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such diverse areas of public policy as taxation, health,
energy, and government organization indicated the very
weakness of the government policy-making apparatus.(18)
In addition, as Wilson has stated, the "Royal Commissions"
were not only a policy input but an output as well,
because they illustrated the government*s concern with
a particular policy area as well as being a means of
buying time.(19)
The roles of advisory councils such as the
National Research Council and the Medical Research
Council, were also circumscribed in terms of policy
input because they were not centrally integrated into
the policy process. Such councils were not only advisory,
but they carried functional programmes whose investigations
are reported to the Cabinet through the ministers of
the appropriate department; therefore, their findings
were not only *allocative*, but *positional* in that they
must compete with other such councils for resources.
While these councils operate within several departments,
they do not interfere in specific research and are
subject to the whims of the pet projects of particular
departments.

Consequently, as discerned by the Glassco

(18) Doern, G. Bruce, "Policy Organization in the
Executive Arena", op_. cit. p. 46.
(19) Wilson, S.V. "The Role of Royal Commissions and
Task Forces," in G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin,
op. cit. pp. 113-113.
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Commission, the councils did not fulfill their
intended purpose of advising the government on broad
research questions and instead focused on regulating
its own affairs and becoming enmeshed with departmental
projects.
Although the failure of the councils could be
as easily attributed to the nature of their activities
or their personnel, this was but another instance of
the Diefenbaker government failing to use potential
policy input by leaving the councils decentralized,
self-regulating and autonomous.(20)
In conclusion then, the Diefenbaker government,
through its preoccupation with electoral prowess,
failed to utilize or did not comprehend the machinery
of public policy whether at the executive level,
government sponsored White Papers and'Royal Commissions,"
or advisory councils comprised largely of non-governmental
personnel.

Policy was therefore nothing but a succession

of electioneering hand-outs, reaction and brokerageincrementalism bereft of planning or insight.

2.

Defence Policy
Since Diefenbaker had insulated- himself from

conventional sources of policy inputs, he relied upon

(20) Aucoin, P. "The Role of Functional Advisory
Councils", in G. Bruce Doern and P. Aucoin,
pp. cit. p. 154-160.
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his political friends; in matters of defence policy,
his advisor was Major-General George Pearkes, Minister
of National Defence.

General Pearkes was a consistent

supporter and friend of Diefenbaker; in the 1948 Tory
leadership convention, Pearkes nominated Diefenbaker
for party leader declaring, "It is the prayer of the
common people of this land that John Diefenbaker be
their leader."(21)

Again in 1956, Pearkes nominated

Diefenbaker stating that he;"was the greatest living
Canadian - a cross between Simon de Montfort and
Benjamin Disraeli."(22)

General Pearkes was a holder

of the Victoria Cross, and the Conservative defence
critic during St. Laurent*s government. He had also
distinguished himself however, through his role in the
somewhat unsavoury incidents pertaining to civilian
control during and after the war.

Pearkes, in

conjunction with General Foulkes, was to have profound
influence upon the determination of Mr. Diefenbaker*s
defence policy, the implications of which were to be
felt a few years hence during the unification debates.
In fairness to Mr. Diefenbaker, the issues of
defence, N.O.R.A.D., N.A.T.O., the Arrow and the Cuban
missile crisis, were not entirely his responsibility;

(21)
(22)

Newman, P.C,
Ibid, p. 46.

op_. cit.

p. 28.

- 65 -

doubtless they were compounded by his inept response
to such issues, but the cost of sophisticated
weaponry, Soviet developments in I.CB.M.'s, the
confrontation between Kennedy and Krushchev, were
clearly external to his capability and responsibility.(23)
In addition, many defence issues arose during previous
Liberal administrations which were shelved pending the
outcome of an election. Many tentative agreements had
already been initiated when the Conservatives took
office and in fact criticism often centred not upon the
issues themselves but upon Diefenbaker*s method, or lack
of it, in resolving them.
It is doubtlessly true that Canadian defence
policy since the last war has been predicated upcn
collective defence, acting in concert with Canada's
allies.

To this end, Canada was engaged in a number of

collective defence measures aimed at co-operation with
the U.S. Informal agreements were drawn up for Canada
and the U.S. to exchange intelligence, weapons and
research developments.

Plans provided for joint naval

exercises, L.O.R.A.N, navigation stations, the Pinetree
Line, McGill Fence, and the Distant Early Warning Line
(DEW) to detect Soviet aircraft penetration of northern

(23) McLin, Jon B. Canada.'s Changing Defence Policy
1957-1963. The Problems of a Middle Power in
Alliance, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1967). pp. 7-3.
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defences tsuch devices were to protect the Strategic
Air Command (SAC) rather than Canadian soil).

The

principles of co-operation in this bilateral defence
effort however, were emphatic that Canada retain control
of U.S. bases in Canada.(24)
At the same time, Canadians were becoming
increasingly concerned about the dependence of Canada's
defences upon U.S. strategy and requirements, and thus
welcomed participation in ll.A.T.O. as a means to .
offset U.S. influence.

Canada was, according to McLin,

particularly enthusiastic for the opportunity to
purchase influence through contribution to European
defence. Such commitments involved one infantry
brigade and twelve squadrons of interceptors which were
to be brought home after European military strength was
less fragile.

Concern was also expressed, especially

by Lester Pearson, as to the extent of consultation
which would occur between the U.S. and her allies in
the event of an emergency.

Pearson warned against

'entrenched continentalism*(25). Such issues however,
were left unresolved until after the election.

(3) N.O.R.A.D.
In response to already existing joint co-operation

(24)
(25)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 28.
p. 25.
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between Canada and the U.S., in 1956 a joint U.S.Canadian study group began to examine the feasibility
of joint command in continental defence. The U.S.
Chiefs of Staff were anxious to pursue the recommendations of the study group thatajoint headquarters for
air defence be established.

Ralph Campney, Minister

of National Defence in the St. Laurent government,
urged the Cabinet Defence Committee to agree with the
recommendations of the study group; however, Campney
later informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs that the decision
would be delayed pending the June election, which the
Liberals were confident of winning.

After the Liberals

were defeated, Lester Pearson denied that the Cabinet
Defence Committee, or the Cabinet, had given consent to
the agreement, however, it was revealed that in fact
External Affairs had been engaged in negotiations for
two years and the military aspects had already been
worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
General Foulkes, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee, approached General George Pearkes to
expedite the government approval of the N.O.R.A.D.
agreement. General Pearkes was then able to convince
Mr. Diefenbaker, who was acting as his own Minister for
External Affairs, to express his consent to the agreement
when U.S. Secretary .of State Dulles arrived in Ottawa.
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Five days after this meeting, General Pearkes
announced the N.O.R.A.D. agreement.(26)
The substantive agreements of N.O.R.A.D. were
not, at this time, at issue; Diefenbaker acted solely
on the advice of Pearkes and Foulkes, and gave his
verbal assurances to Dulles without consulting the
Cabinet, External Affairs, or the Cabinet Defence
Committee.(27)

His failure to do so was later confirmed

by Sidney Smith, whom Diefenbaker had placed as head
of External Affairs.

General Foulkes, in his testimony

before the Special Committee on Defence stated;
"Unfortunately - I am afraid - we stampeded the incoming
government with the N.O.R.A.D. agreement."(28)

As McLin

states:
"It seems highly probable...that neither
the Cabinet Defence Committee not- the
full Cabinet was the agency of decision;
the implementation of the agreement
preceded not only its discussion by
Parliament but antedated by some eight

(26)
(27)
(28)

Ibid, pp. 40-41.
Newman, P.C. pp. cit. p. 347.
Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on
Defence, 1963, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1963). Testimony
of General Foulkes, p. 510. Hereafter referred to
as General Foulkes testimony. General Foulkes also
testified that the N.O.R.A.D. decision was taken in
the absence of.the Cabinet Defence Committee
because at that point, August 1957, no such Committee
had been set up. "The Minister of National Defence
took the paper and got it approved. I have no
knowledge and if I had - it would hot be wise to
reveal it - whether it went to the Cabinet or not.
p. 527.
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months the signature of a formal
agreement between governments."(29)
Although Pearson chastized the government for
its flagrant disregard for procedure in failing to
bring the agreement before Parliament,(30) the N.O.R.A.D.
agreement also came under scrutiny concerning command
relationships, consultation, and the relationship
between N.O.R.A.D. and N.A.T.O. Despite Diefenbaker's
attempts to describe joint command, that is, operational
command in the event of an emergency, as 'operational
control' to placate his critics,(31) it was obvious
that unless the commander of N.O.R.A.D. had the
authority to use Canadian forces, N.O.R.A.D. would have
been a sterile agreement.

'Consultation' created some

trepidation among Opposition critics who feared that
Canada might suddenly be involved in an American war.(32)
In fact, consultation was to be an on-going process with
formal lines of communication presumably so that
Canada would not be caught unawares. On the matter of
N.A.T.O./N.O.R.A.D. relations, the government, for
overtly political purposes, sought to leave the
impression that they were interdependent. This, however,

(29) McLin, J.B., op_. cit. p. 49.
(30) Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: Queens
Printer). June 10, 1958, Vol. I, pp. 1000-1004.
Hereafter referred to as Debates
(3D Ibid, pp. 995-996.
(32) McLin, J.B., op. cit, p. 51.
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was completely erroneous.(33)

(4) The AVRO-Arrow Issue
The debates over the AVRO-Arrow focused upon
the objectives of defence policy, which the Diefenbaker
government was most ambivalent on.
The Arrow was an all-weather interceptor,
capable of speeds of Mach Two, designed to counter
anticipated Soviet turbo-jet bomber aircraft.(34)

The

initial proposal of the service chiefs was that the
airframe be developed in Canada, with the engine, fire
control system, and weapons systems to be purchased
elsewhere.

It was hoped that the Arrow, with the

requisite equipment, would have a production run of
close to six hundred, at a cost under $2 million each.
Although the A.V. Roe Company originally intended to
use Rolls-Royce engines, or the U.S. Wright engines,
they began, through Orenda Engine, to develop

their

own engine, thus adding to the unit cost of the aircraft.
The contract for the fire-control system was to have
been developed by Hughes Aircraft, but they declined the
contract, which was passed on to R.C.A., at a

y

considerably increased cost due to the modifications

(33) Debates, op. cit. pp. 994-995.
(34) Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on
Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence (May 17, I960) (Ottawa; Queens Printer,
lyou) p. 88. Hereafter referred to as the Halpenny
Committee.
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required in the aircraft.(35)

The Velvet Glove air-

to-air missile, designed in Canada, was obsolete before
its completion and hence the government elected to use
the U.S. Navy Sparrow II. The U.S. Navy however, had
decided to phase out this programme and suggested that
if the Canadians still desired this system, they should
complete its design and production themselves.(36)

By

early 1957, estimates of per unit cost had risen to
$8 million and the Liberals were of course cautious
not to raise the issue before June.(37)
After the election and the Conservative victory,
the development of the Arrow suffered further setbacks.
Among the most destructive of these was the recognition
that of the nine regular and eleven auxilliary squadrons
which were to have the aircraft, only the regular forces
would receive sufficient pilot training to man such a
sophisticated weapon system; consequently, the production
run was reduced to 100 units at an approximate cost of
$12.5 million each.

To compound matters further,

production delays underlined the shift in strategic
requirements for manned interceptors in the light of

(35) McLin, J.B. pja. cit. p. 64.
(36) Deputy Minister of National Defence Miller stated
that the Sparrow was dropped by the U.S. Navy
because they wanted a lower altitude weapon.
Halpenny Committee, May 17, I960, p. 87.
(37) McLin, J.B. p_£. cit. p. 69.
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Soviet missile developments.(38)

The government was

therefore confronted with two alternatives to increase
production so as to reduce unit costs: first to append
the Arrow to Canada's N.A.T.O.'s contribution in
Europe, which was not practicable because of the absence
of S.A.G.E.;(39) secondly, to sell the aircraft to the
U.S. which was reluctant to acquire an unproven system
and had conflicting interests with its own aircraft
industry.
Diefenbaker consistently refused to admit that
the exorbitant costs of such equipment was too high
and instead announced that while production of the
Arrow would be curtailed, development would continue
for six months, and in the interim, Canada would
acquire Bomarc missiles. Such

vacillation on defence

policy created another dilemma. Diefenbaker sought to
explain the cancellation of the Arrow in terms of
strategic requirements, namely, that I.CB.M.s eliminated
the need for manned interceptors. Meanwhile, he had
accepted Bomarc missiles, whose strategic designation
was clearly anti-bomber.(40)
General Pearkes, under the aegis of Diefenbaker,
maintained that the Arrow was being discontinued for
strategic reasons; but argued too, that manned

(38) Gen.Foulkes testimony, October 22, 1963, pp. 509-510 .
(39) McLin, J.B. p_p_. _cit. p. 70 .
(40) Ibid, pp. 74-75.
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interceptors would still be needed.(41)

In this

contention, General Pearkes was supported by the
Chiefs of StaffCommittee who insisted that if the
Arrow were discontinued, it must be replaced,
preferably by a cheaper U.S. aircraft.(42)

He later

admitted that the Arrow was scrapped largely for
reasons of cost.

'Scrapped' is particularly

appropriate because Diefenbaker insisted that the
existing prototypes be destroyed and were subsequently
sent to Waxman's junk yard in Hamilton.(43)

(5) The Bomarc Missiles
General Pearkes, again, had considerable
influence in the Bomarc issue; he asked the U.S.
authorities if Bomarcs could be placed in Canada to
protect population centers.(44)

It was feared that

unless some form of air defence system was placed in
Canada's northern regions (North Bay) that a
hypothetical atomic war would have as its battleground

(41)
(42)

Ibid, pp. 80-84.
General Foulkes stated that: "it did not make
military sense to purchase aircraft at a cost of
$8 million each when we could maintain aircraft
with similar performance from the end of an
American production line at something about $2
million." Foulkes testimony, October 22, 1963,
p. 510.
(43) Newman, P.C. op_. cit. p. 348.
(44) McLin, J.B. op_. cit. p. 86.
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major population centers in the south.(45)

At a

meeting in 1958 between U.S. and Canadian delegations
headed by U.S. Secretary McElroy and General Pearkes,
the Canadians were informed that unless the Bomarc
was accepted, the U.S. would establish a site south of
the Great Lakes, thus assuring the incineration of the
Toronto region, in the event of nuclear war.(46)

This

veiled threat was mitigated somewhat because the
U.S. service chiefs, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff
Committee, and General Pearkes were convinced of the
Bomarc's utility: all that remained was for Diefenbaker
to acquiesce.
Confusion arose because there were in fact two
Bomarcs: the A model, which could carry either a
nuclear or a conventional warhead; the B model was
capable of greater range and would carry only a nuclear
warhead.

Both versions of the Bomarc were essentially

unmanned aircraft using jet fuel.

Diefenbaker,

initially, did not appear to be cognizant of such
distinctions,(47) but later stated, in 1959, that:
"the full potential of these defensive weapons is

(45)

Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on
Defence, June 18, 1963, p. 17. Hereafter
referred to as the Sauve* Committee.
(46) McLin, J.B. ap_. cit. p. 87.
(47) Newman, P.C. op,, cit. p. 349.
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achieved only when they are armed with nuclear
warheads."(48)
Having committed Canada to the acquisition of
Bomarcs, the government was rudely shocked when the
U.S. House Military Appropriations Subcommittee wanted
to eliminate the Bomarc programme. Although the U.S.
administration decided to continue its development
concurrently with the Nike-Hercules programme,
Canada's air defence policy was again in jeopardy.
Pearkes attempted to conceal the inter-service
controversy in the U.S. by claiming that the criticism
was directed at the Bomarc A.

The fat was in the fire

however, when the U.S., following a study conducted by
the U.S.A.F., decided to cut back the production of
Bomarcs.(49)

The House Appropriations Committee then

recommended that the Bomarc programme should be
eliminated altogether.

Appropriately, Representative

Daniel Flood of Pennsylvania pointedly remarked, "I
would rather be a congressman from Cuba this week than
the Secretary of Defence in Canada. " (50)
Certainly the most irritating aspect of the
cancellation of the Bomarc was that Canada, having only

(48) McLin, J.B. 0£. cit. pp. 87-88.
(49) Ibid, p. 91.
(50) Ibid, p. 95-
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recently signed the N.O.R.A.D. agreement which
included provision for * consultation*, was not in
fact consulted at all, but rather informed of the
American's intentions.
Although in June, I960, the Senate Military
Appropriations Subcommittee recommended to the House
of Representatives that the $294 million cut from the
Bomarc project be returned,(51) Canadian Opposition
members were extremely critical of the plan to deploy
the Bomarcs in Canada, due to, firstly, their
vulnerability, and secondly, that the government agreed
to accept them without having resolved the issue of
nuclear warheads. The Liberals, in particular Mr.
Pearson, argued that the use of such warheads be
renounced, as well as their delivery system; they
re-iterated the need for a manned interceptor.(52)
The significance of such debates however, is, as McLin
points out:
"the Bomarc dispute produced somewhat
clearer lines of disagreement between
the major parties, and thereby opened

(51)

The Bomarc *B' squadrons were ultimately
constructed and remained operational at North
Bay until 1970. The first of six U.S. squadrons
was phased out in 1970 and the remainder in
1972. Janes Weapons Systems 1972-1973 (London:
Paulton House, 1973) p. 52.
(52) McLin, J.B. op_. cit. pp. 97-99*
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the way for a thorough debate on
defence that was needed."(53)
Secondly, since Diefenbaker had accepted the Bomarc
but had refused nuclear warheads, "the Bomarcs remained
headless and totally useless."(54)

(6)

Nuclear Weapons
The case of the Bomarc was illustrative of the

dilemma faced by the Diefenbaker government, for while
Diefenbaker adamantly refused to accept nuclear
capability, he persisted in acquiring weapons systems
which were either explicitly designed for nuclear
weapons or those which could utilize either nuclear or
conventional armaments, which, in the latter instance,
were of highly questionable value. Although the R.C.A.F.
wanted nuclear armaments for the Arrow they were
relatively content, even though both the Sparrow II and
Falcon missiles were equipped conventionally.(55)
Nonetheless, the Arrow could have been equipped with
nuclear armaments.

The Bomarc B, designed for anti-

bomber defences, could, if equipped with atomic
warheads, 'cook* Soviet bombs, rendering them harmless,
whereas conventionally armed missiles, though destroying

(53) Ibid, p. 100.
(54) Newman, P.C. o_p_. cit. p. 350.
(55) McLin, J.B. p_p_. cit. p. 130.
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enemy aircraft, could result in the detonation of
their payload upon ground impact.

The Lacrosse and

Honest John rockets (delivered to the brigade in
Europe) could have been armed either by nuclear or
conventional means, however, the Honest John was
considered *most inefficient* if armed conventionally.
The F104*s delivered to the air division in Europe
were similar to the Bomarc and Honest John rockets,
completely unarmed, although they were designed to
carry nuclear weapons. The Voodoos acquired from the
U.S.A.F. in return for Canadair CF104 contracts were
conventionally armed although while in U.S.A.F. service
they were nuclear equipped.

The net result of such

purchases, quite apart from the unceremonious junking
of the Arrow prototypes meant, as Newman has observed,
that:
"Canada, under John Diefenbaker*s
management had spent $685 millions
for the most impressive collection of
blank cartridges in the history of
military science."(56)
The issue was not that Diefenbaker held an unequivocable,
clearly delineated non-nuclear policy; rather, it was
that:
"All this military hardware had been
acquired and then became useless for
one reason: John Diefenbaker could not

(56)

Newman, P.C

ojo. cit.

p. 354.
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make up his mind to arm the
weapons. He seemed to fear the
political consequences of decision.
His cabinet was hopelessly split on
the issue."(57)

Two events precipitated the disintegration of
Diefenbaker*s defence policy; the Cuban crisis and the
remarks of former N.A.T.O. Commander General Norstad.
Following the realization that Soviet ships were
transporting missiles to bases in Cuba, U.S. President
Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine; N.O.R.A.D. went on
alert at Defcon 3.

(Defence Condition 3, a N.O.R.A.D.

state of readiness with Defcon 5 being 'normal* and
Defcon 1 being *nuclear attack*).

Canada, through

N.O.R.A.D. Deputy Commander R.CA.F. Air Marshal Slemon,
was requested to respond accordingly.

Such a state of

readiness had received the support of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee and Minister of National Defence
Harkness, but required Diefenbaker*s approval.
Diefenbaker delayed his decision for one day, ostensibly
to co-ordinate civil defence efforts, but was in fact
simply avoiding the decision. When Howard Green of
External Affairs, cautioned that Canada should not '

(57)

Ibid,

p. 341.
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plunge into action, Diefenbaker took up the clarion
call and persuaded the Cabinet to reject Harkness*
demand for alert. Pressure from N.O.R.A.D. and the
military however, could no longer be withstood and,
forty-two hours after N.O.R.A.D. had requested a state
of Defcon 3 for Canadian units, the request was
finally heeded.(58)

As Newman observed:

"It took the Cuban crisis to show the
Canadian people that John Diefenbaker*s
state of indecision had passed the
point of responsible statesmanship.
The Cuban affair also destroyed any
remaining illusions Canadians may have
had that the Diefenbaker government
had a national defence policy...
Diefenbaker had led Canada into
military undertakings which he had then
prevented from being met."(59)
Four months later in January, 1963, General
Norstad held a press conference in Ottawa, where he
announced, in response to a series of questions about
Canada*s role in N.A.T.O., that if Canada did not
accept tactical nuclear strike squadrons, her N.A.T.O.
commitments would not be fulfilled.(60)

Three weeks

later Diefenbaker was still procrastinating about
providing the CF104 Starfighter with nuclear weapons;
instead he declared that; "More and more the nuclear

(53)
(59)
(60)

Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,

pp. 337-339.
p. 333.
pp. 352-355*
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deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more
nuclear arms will add nothing material to our
defence."(61)

Curiously, Harkness attempted to

interpret the Prime Minister*s remarks as being
favourable to nuclear armament.

It soon became

evident, however, that such was not the case.

Later

that week, during a Cabinet meeting, Harkness,
formerly a Lieutenant-Colonel, attacked Diefenbaker
for failing to make a clear decision on defence policy.
Since the Prime Minister would not, Harkness resigned,
thus setting in motion the chain of events which was
to bring down the Diefenbaker government.(62)

(7) Summary
Doern and Aucoin*s description of policymaking in the Diefenbaker government as * fused,
personalized and passive* is particularly pertinent to
defence policy.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker*s failure to

utilize sources of policy input other than that tendered
by a coterie of political allies, his persistently
incremental approach to policy, his deliberate confusing
of defence issues and his excessive reliance upon
General Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff Committee resulted
in a defence policy devoid of any coherent, long-range

(61)
(62)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 361 .
pp. 363-365.
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programme.

The absense of civilian control and

direction over defence policy, since it had already
been surrendered to General Pearkes and the Chiefs of
Staff, coupled with the revelations of the Glassco
Commission, led inevitably to unification.
The third chapter, on Mr. Pearson's
government, discusses innovations in the policy-making
process, and the restructuring of influence which
occurred as a result of unification leading to the
assertion of civilian control and direction over the
military.

This chapter shall also describe the principal

opposition to Mr. Hellyer*s programme to eliminate the
three service elements.
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Chapter III: The Pearson Period:
Programme Management
The Pearson administration was the
transitional period between the fused and passive
policy structures of the Diefenbaker government and
the output-oriented, activist organizations of the
Trudeau regime; that is, there were several innovations
in policy structures which functionally performed
similar roles as they had during Diefenbaker*s tenure,
but came to fruition under Trudeau.

Most notable

among these changes were the relative independence of
the Treasury Board vis a vis the Department of Finance,
which later resulted in the Treasury Board being
responsible for the Planning Programming and Budgeting
System (P.P.B.S.) and the expansion and differentiation
of the P.M.O. and the P.CO.

Thus, the Pearson

administration was the progenitor of what George
Szablowski has called the * optimal* policy-making
system.(1)

(1) New Sources of Policy Inputs
In Doern and Aucoin*s assessment of policy-making
under Pearson's leadership, it is suggested that such

(1) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System:
Implications for the Canadian Political Pre cess", in
T.A. Hockin (ed.) Apex of Power (Toronto: PrenticeHall, 1971). p. 135.
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innovations occurred largely because of the Prime
Minister's expertise in compromise and negotiations,
that such new policy-making machinery was ;
"instinctively encouraged as being sensible and
useful additions."(2).

No doubt, however, that the

willingness to experiment was complemented by the
optimistic expectations for the economy and the
contention of Walter Gordon that new programmes could
be initiated and financially absorbed without
substantial tax increases.(3) While new sources of
policy input were encouraged, they arose on an ad hoc
basis rather than being both programme oriented and
cross-departmental,(4) as would be suggested by
optiraal-P.P.B.S. management.
There were however, two significant factors
which contributed heavily to the development of
policy-making organizations; the first of these being
the recommendations of the Glassco Commission, and
secondly, Pearson's attitude twoards the civil service.
In respect to the civil service, it has been alleged
by Schindler, that the civil service attained its
pinnacle of power during the government of St. Laurent

(2) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin,
op. cit. p. 53.
(3) Ibid, p. 53.
(4) Ibid, p. 57.
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and Pearson.(5)
"Policy was initiated in a given
department...and only when the senior
civil servants had a firm proposal to
make did it come to the attention of
the appropriate Minister who then
presented it to the full Cabinet.
Having had little or no opportunity
to evaluate the merits of the
proposal before it was presented to
Cabinet, the other members of the
Cabinet usually confirmed the
recommendation."(6)
Although Pearson did not distrust the civil service as
does his successor,(7) nonetheless, as Maurice Lamontagne
has pointed out, the Liberals under Mr. Pearson, having
used non-governmental advisors in the formulation of
policy while as members of the Opposition, were likely to
employ the same methods when forming the government.(8)
"Thus a new period is emerging in our
country. I would describe it as the
twilight of civil servants...I mean...
that the Establishment will play a more
limited role than in the past twentyfive years and that it will have to
share its privileged position near
Ministers with new sources of political
influence."(9)

F. "The Prime Minister and.the^Cabinet:
(5) Schindler,
History and Development", i n T.A. Hockm, OJD. c i t .
p. 27.

(6) Ibid, p. 27.
(7) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of

Policy Making in Canada" in the Canadian Journal of
Political Science (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1971). Vol. IV, No. 2, 1971. p. 246.
(8) Lamontagne, M. "The Influence of the Politician",
in Canadian Public Administration (Toronto:
Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1968)
Vol. II, No. 3, 1968. p. 266.
(9) Ibid, p. 266.
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Certainly, analysis of the Pearson government
would be incomplete without due consideration being
given to the Glassco Commission, with particular
attention focused upon the Treasury Board, and, as
shall be described later, the Department of National
Defence.

The Glassco Commission:

"recommended that departments and
agencies be given the necessary
authority and be held responsible for
the management of money and staff...
In the process, the Civil Service
Commission and the Comptroller of the
Treasury would be divested of various
controlling powers they now possess,
and much of the scrutiny by the
Treasury Board of the details of
departmental administration would be
discontinued."(10)
Further:
"The new Board should...concentrate on
the essential functions of
administrative co-ordination and
leadership: balancing programmes and
defining priorities..."(11)
One of the most important results of the Glassco
Commission was, as Doern points out that:
"The influx of accounting and
financial personnel brought in to
implement the Glassco recommendations
on departmental accounts and control
practices soon produced a cadre of
experts who became concerned about

(10)
(11)

Glassco Commission,
p. 81.
Ibid, p. 81.

op_. cit.

Vol. 5, No. 24,
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the wider, central processes of
source allocations."(12)
In 1966 S.I.M.P.A.C, (Systems of Integral
Management Planning and Control) was beginning to
collect information from both the private and public
sector to assist not only the calculations of programme
costs but also to estimate their potential output.(13)•
Pursuant to the Glassco Commission's recommendations,
the Treasury Board acquired its own President and thus
became, particularly with the advent of P.P.B.S.,
increasingly independent relative to the Department of
Finance.

Nonetheless, the Treasury Board continued to

think of P.P.B.S.:
"in relation to government expenditures
and programmes rather than in terms of
the impact of that philosophy on the
relationship among the main central
policy organizations."(14)
Whereas under Diefenbaker the policy roles of
the P.M.O. and P.CO. were fused, the addition of Tom
Kent as Pearson's policy advisor meant that there was
both a definite and 'visible* political presence

(12) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of
Policy Making in Canada", in the Canadian Journal
of Political Science, op. cit. p. 255.
(13) Ibid, p. 255,
(14) Doern, G.B., "The Development of Policy
Organization in the Executive Arena", in G.B.
Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 52.
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representing the Liberal party.

Through Kent's effort,

the political role of the P.M.O. became more clearly
differentiated from the P.CO.

The P.CO., rather than

being an anomalous entity confronting diverse policy
matters, was subdivided under four assistant secretaries
having their own particular areas of concern. While
such division of responsibility was not sufficient to
allow for policy activists, nonetheless the structural
differentiation of the P.CO. under Pearson did provide
the basis for further sources of policy input under
Trudeau.(15)
Although Pearson, like Diefenbaker, relied
heavily upon Royal Commissions (an average of four per
year), such commissions were of generally an incremental
orientation, although some, like the Hall Commission on
Medicare, did to some extent

suggest innovate policy.(16)

The Pearson government however, did introduce the "task
force" concept which had been utilized by U.S. President
Kennedy.

Such task forces were relatively inexpensive,

quick, and relied largely upon extra-governmental sources
in order to circumvent the sluggishness of the civil

(15) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin,
op. cit. pp. 4*3-49.
(16) Wilson, S.V. "The Role of Royal Commissions and Task
Forces", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 116.
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service.

As Wilson has observed however:

"It is difficult to determine the policy
effectiveness of the extra-governmental
task forces, because as Lloyd Oxworth
has noted, 'under Lester Pearson, the
Canadian Cabinet behaVed in the fashion
of a modified confederation of Chinese
war lords...* Nonethless it remains
true that no hard thinking was devoted to
the manner in which task forces fitted
into a federal policy-making system..."(17)
In 1963, the Economic Council of Canada was
established.

It was felt, and Pearson concurred, that

having such a Council outside of government bureaucracy,
would contribute to a * consensus* of economic planning
within both the public and private sectors, without
being constrained by government-inspired policy
decisions.

Thus, the Economic Council, through research

and conferences on economic matters, played an advisory
role to government as well as to the private sector;
it has therefore been an important input into the
formulation of economic policy.

It should be pointed

out that the Conservatives had also initiated the
Productivity Council which reported to the Departments
of Labour and Industry. It was not however, endowed
with the independence and scope of the Economic Council,
in fact, the Economic Council was permitted to publish
its findings without necessarily having government

(17)

Ibid,

p. 123.
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approval.(18)
With regards to the functional advisory
Councils, both the Glassco and Hall Commissions
determined that they had become * self-regulatory*
rather than being regulated by the government. As
a consequence, during the Pearson government, this
criticism led to the founding of the Science
Secretariat under the P.CO. and the Science
Council.(19) While there was no doubt difficulty
created in the relationship between the Science
Secretariat and the Science Council due to, in some cases,
joint membership, both organizations did contribute to
attempts to define a national science policy as well as
to oversee the Medical Research and the National
Research Councils.(20)
Contrasting with the Diefenbaker period, during
which White Papers were used to publicize government
policy, White Papers under Pearson became an instrument

(18)

Phidd, R.W. "The Role of Central Advisory Councils:
The Economic Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and
P. Aucoin, op. cit. pp. 204-216.
(19) Aucoin, P. '•The Role of Functional Advisory
Councils", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, o_p_. cit. p. 165.
(20) Doern G.B., "The Role of Central Advisory Councils:
The Science Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and
P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 248.
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of testing opinion of 'intended' government policy.
The White Paper on Defence(21) was utilized for this
purpose particularly because the government, having a
minority in Parliament, needed some Opposition support
for such controversial policy(22); needless to say,
such tendering for public opinion, in this case, met
with unqualified, though not necessarily welcome,
success.
It can be seen therefore, that the Pearson
government, though not as entirely 'rationalistic' as
that of its successor Mr. Trudeau, did encourage new
sources of policy input which were not bound to the
turgid incrementalism of the past. The redefinition of
roles for advisory organizations, the restructuring and
differentiation of policy-making roles at the executive
level, and the broader perspective of departmental
accounting by way of the Treasury Board and S.I.M.P.A.C,
though they did not reach operational maturity under
Pearson, were unquestionably significant in the
evolution of the policy process.

(21)

Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper
on Defence. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, I964T This
publication outlines Hellyer*s programme for
unification as well as re-examining Canadian
defence priorities.
(22) Doern, A.D. "The Role of White Papers'*, in
G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 184.
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(2) The Reorientation of Defence Policy
The efforts of the Pearson government to
implement the new management procedures recommended by
the Glassco Commission, the development of new sources
of policy initiative, and the fledgling attempts to
disassociate programme outputs from the incrementalism
of the past was also represented in matters of defence
policy.

Such efforts acquired two forms; the redefinition

of defence priorities and capabilities with respect to
collective agreements, and the reorganization of the
defence forces.

Certainly these two tasks were not

unrelated, since management, and civilian control
and direction of the forces were co-terminous with the
redefinition of priorities and their eventual
subjection to P.P.B.S.
The first step taken by the Liberals was to set
up the Special Committee on Defence, the Sauve Committee,(23)
to examine not only defence costs but also policy.

The

Sauve Committee called in non-government personnel to
testify and to make recommendations at its'hearings; in
addition, supplementary studies were in due course
commissioned to deal with defence policy, security /
agreements, arms control and disarmament.

As well,

(23) Sauve was the first chairman of the House of
Commons Special Committee on Defence.
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a review of all defence commitments was begun. In
the interim, the government suspended further equipment
purchases.

This was done, according to Paul Hellyer,

because previously: "policy has been set to agree with
the equipment already decided on."(24)

Pursuant to

this policy review, the government, with Mr. Hellyer as
Minister of National Defence, published the White Paper
on Defence of 1964.
This White Paper indicated significant changes
in government policy pertaining to defence commitments;
namely, that Canada should determine roles and
equipment requirements of her own forces rather than
such roles and requirements being appended to the
prescriptions of alliance commitments.

These changes

took the form of a restructuring of defence priorities
in which U.N. operations took precedence over alliances.
As McLin has noted:
"In the past, the precedence of the
former (alliances) had meant that
peacekeeping operations had to be
undertaken by forces the shape of
which was determined primarily by
alliance commitments. Now, however,
those commitments were to be made
only after the development of a
coherent policy in which such

(24)

Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on
Defence, 1964. Minutes of Proceedings and
Evidence. May 19, 1964, p. 11 Hereafter
referred to as the Hahn Committee
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factors as the requirements for
peacekeeping forces would be taken
into account."(25)
Correspondingly, it was felt also, that this
redefinition of priorities would adumbrate the excessive
costs of trying to equip the forces with highly
sophisticated equipment designed specifically for
alliance commitments; namely the CF104*s strikereconnaisance role in N.A.T.O.

Instead, the government

desired that Canadian forces be organized and equipped
for a multiplicity of operational roles as relatively
autonomous, self-contained units. By way of example,
the brigades in Europe were to be equipped with their
own air support and air transport.

As a corollary

benefit, this policy meant that Canadian forces could
be equipped through domestic defence industries such as
Canadair.

Canadian forces then, were to be self-contained,

flexible and highly mobile contingents more amenable to
U.N. requirements than to strategic requirements of the
alliance.(26)
It should be indicated however, that despite the
emphasis given to peacekeeping, the equipment that
Canada already possessed, Bomarcs, Honest John rockets

(25) McLin, J.B. pjg. cit. p. 208.
(26) Ibid, pp. 195-200,
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and Voodoos, were in fact, supplemented with a variety
of heavy equipment designed for diverse service roles.
The White Paper also confirmed the present roles of
the brigade and air division units in Europe; hence,
alliance commitments were obviously not being
abandoned.(27)

Nonetheless, the Pearson government

approached the issue of alliance commitments,
particularly nuclear commitments, cautiously.
Although both the Honest Johns and the Bomarcs
were armed, the Liberals were reluctant to engage in
subsequent debates over continued deployment of nuclear
weapons systems. This became particularly evident in
view of Canada*s * virtual abstention* from debates
concerning the U.S. proposed *multi-lateral-force (M.L.F.)
for N.A.T.O.(28)

As McLin explains:

"One of the reasons for this relative
silence on questions of central
importance for the future character of
Canada*s alliance stands out above all
others: the desire, indeed the political
necessity, to avoid reviving the recently
ended trauma about the acquisition of
nuclear weapons."(29)
The Pearson government, having rejected additional nuclear
roles, then set about designing defence policy around
the utilization of conventional forces for multinational
and domestic requirements.

(27) White Paper on Defence, 1964 op. cit.
(28) McLin, J.B. oj>. cit. p. 209.
(29) Ibid, p. 211.

p. 21.
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(3) Force Reorganization and Unification
/ The effect of the Glassco Commission as
described earlier, was to highlight the enormous
difficulties which confronted the Canadian armed
services: the disparity between manpower and equipment
costs; duplication of services; the unwieldy committee
structure; the absence of executive authority in the
Chiefs of Staff Committee; and the realization that due
to inadequate staffing in the Deputy Minister*s office
and the multiplicity of channels directed to the
Minister, civilian control was in jeopardy.

The

Pearson governments remedy for these issues was
unification of the services.)
Although the Glassco Commission had rejected
unification, instead recommending that the Chairman of
the C S . C be granted some executive authority, the
White Paper insisted that such a plan was inadequate:
"In the opinion of the Government, this
solution does not adequately resolve
the basic issues. If a single command
structure is not established,
co-ordination by the committee systems
will remain with all of its inevitable
delays and frustrations. The
fundamental considerations are
operation control and effectiveness,
the streamlining of procedures, and, in
particular, the decision-making process,
and the redirection of overhead. To
the extent that operational command is
exercized by Canada, it is the view of
the government that it can be most
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effectively exercized by a single
command."(30)
This meant of course, that the armed forces would be
integrated at the headquarters level, having a single
Chief of Defence Staff.

This then, would be the first

step towards ultimate unification.
Having accomplished this however, the central
question remains, why was unification necessary if
integration would accomplish many of the objectives of
military organization.
The answer to this is inexorably tied in to
defence policy being envisaged as a programme output
rather than being an incremental extention of previous
policy.

The Diefenbaker government would not extricate

itself from the demands of alliance commitments and
equipment purchases.

Concomitantly, the government had

denied itself the infusion of policy initiatives,
prefering alternatively to rely upon the personal
persuasions of General Foulkes, the Chairman of Chiefs
of Staff, who assisted the *stampeding* of the
government into N.O.R.A.D., and General Pearkes, the
Minister of National Defence, who, as a serving officer
and later as member of the government, demonstrated little
hesitation in infringing upon civilian control or

(30) White Paper on Defence 1964, op. cit.

pp. 18-19.
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granting ascendency to the military viewpoint. These
• factors, coupled with a relating benign and understaffed
Deputy Minister*s office, and the self-ordained
jurisdictions of the separate services, meant that
defence planning as a part of national and central
policy objectives was virtually non-existent.

This is

precisely what Hellyer hoped to achieve through
. unification, which could not be accomplished merely
through the integration of the Chiefs of Staff Committee;
\ there had to be expanded provision for civilian direction,
that is, a 'restructuring of influence* in the
f determination of defence policy.

This was to be

i effected through functional command, that is, programme' tasking of the service elements.
Mr. Hellyer was adamant in his delineation of
governmental and military responsibilities':
"Ministers of National Defence are by
law, responsible for the armed forces.
I believe I have to listen to all of
the advice that is available...But,
having listened to it and evaluated it
and analysed it, it is then the
responsibility of the Minister to make
a decision and recommend that decision
to the government."(31)
Mr. Hellyer, as Byers has stated:
"was convinced...that over the years the
military had increased its role to the
point where civilian control was being
endangered by the inability of civilians

(31)

Byers, R.B.

op. cit.

p. 2.
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and politicians to adequately assess
the proposals presented to them."(32)
In May of I964, Hellyer asserted that the
reorganization of the forces would:
"permit an effective exercise of
civilian control and equally important,
civilian direction in the carrying out of
defence policy as laid down by the
government."(33)
Hellyer then proceeded to undertake a number of measures
to ensure the civilian control and direction of the
forces.

He created the office of Chief of Defence

Staff to replace the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee so as to expediate decision-making and to
reduce separate service demands upon the Minister.
As Mr. Hellyer testified before the Hahn Committee:(34)
"The main difference will be in practice...
that submissions from the military force,
from the chief of defence staff to the
Minister and associate Ministers, will
be considered and analysed by the Deputy
Minister*s staff before they are
considered in the defence council and
before decisions are taken in respect of
them...so that the Minister will have the
advantage of a civilian point of view...
there have been many cases throughout the
years when proposals, particularly those
having operational aspects, have not been
^ given any analysis other than the analysis

(32)
(33)
(34)

Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid- P- 5,
Hahn succeeded Sauve as Chairman of the Special
Committee on Defence. This Committee was a
forum for the debates on Bill 90, the integration
stage of unification.
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they received in the forces before
being proposed to the Minister."(35)
Having eliminated the three service chiefs, Mr. Hellyer
stated that:
"problems of civilian control would
be very much simplified. It will no
longer be necessary to deal with three
Defence staffs, which necessarily
resulted in a good deal of the resources
and energies of the civil staff being
applied to problems of co-ordination."(36)
The White Paper on Defence alluded to the:
"introduction into the Department of
National Defence a management system
planning and controlling major Defence
programmes at the Department level."(37)
The reference was to control costs on a programme basis,
but, Paul Hellyer also took further steps to insure
civilian control by utilizing the Defence Council as a
'cabinet* to the Department of National Defence. Mr.
Hellyer outlined before the Hahn Commission the development of the relationship between the Chiefs of Staff
Committee and Defence Council, claiming that 'through
custom, a division has occurred*,(38) between these two
organizations because of the intensity of involvement

(35) Hahn Committee, op_. cit. May 28, 1964, p. 38.
(36) Byers, R.B. o£. cit. p. 6.
(37) White Paper on Defence, 1964. op. cit. p. 20.
(38) Hahn Committee, May 19, 1964, oj>. cit. p. 18,
Testimony of Paul Hellyer.
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the Chiefs of Staff Committee were engaged in post-war
negotiations. As a consequence:
"the Chiefs of Staff Committee advises
the Minister'of National Defence
and the Cabinet External Affairs and
Defence Committee on matters of
defence policy and prepares strategic
appreciations and military plans as
required. In addition, the Committee
has been responsible for co-ordinating
the efforts of the armed services in
fulfillment of a single defence policy
and over-all policy direction of joint
service organizations."(39)
The Defence Council, conversely, had been largely
relegated to logistics and personnel duties.(40)
Through the elimination of responsibilities for triservice co-ordination, and the infusion of additional
civilian personnel from both within and outside of the
department, Mr. Hellyer sought to have the Defence
Council become "the principal departmental policy
group."(41)
The Deputy Minister's office, which had been
singled out for criticism by the Glassco Commission for
being unable to cope with the demands being, made upon
it, was to be expanded in order that, as Mr. Hellyer
stated, there would be;"a strong civil staff in the ,
defence department outside of the military chain of

(39)
(40)
(41)

Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 19,
p. 19.
p. 19,
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command"(42), to analyse military requirements and
available resources; the 'defence programming* to which Mr.
Hellyer had eluded .This then would also reduce the
department's dependence on the Chiefs of Staff
Committee for the determination of its finances. As
Byers has observed, Hellyer's statement regarding the
Chiefs of Staff Committee and the role played by the
Deputy Minister and the Defence Council are clearly
indicative that Mr. Hellyer was not at all content
with the degree of civilian control as it existed prior
to unification.
Critical to the reorganization process was the
evolution of functional command; essentially this
meant the elimination of the eleven command structures
which existed under the separate services and the
redistrubtion of six commands organized on a functional
basis.

The new command structure was as follows: Air

Transport Command replaced a very similar organization
of the same name which had previously been under the
authority of the R.CA.F.; Maritime Command (M.A.R.CO.M.)
replaced both east and west coast maritime commands but
with the Pacific command being directed from Halifax
and including, greater integration of sea and air

(42)

Byers, R.B.

o£. cit.

p. 6.
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components;

Air Defence Command (AIRDEFCOM) which

had been located in St. Hubert, Quebec, was relocated
in North Bay, Ontario, with the AIRDEFCOM commander
also being appointed senior Canadian member of N.O.R.A.D.,
Northern Region; Mobile Command (MOBCOM) was to be the
largest command having within it most of the tactical
air and operational land elements (3 brigades);
Training Command (TRAINCOM) replaced Air Training
Command and was to integrate trades common to all
services as well as to innovate new planning techniques
for their utilization; Material Command (MATCOM) was
implemented to integrate the logistics of the three
services into one system.

In addition to the six new

commands, the European brigade and air division
were to

report

directly to headquarters, rather

than to one of the commands.(43)
The new command structure therefore, not only
established a 'task orientation' for Canadian forces
but was also conducive to the breaking up of the
fiefdoms which the separate services had acquired for
themselves.

Not surprisingly, inter-services rivalry

intensified as the services engaged in jerrymandering
to influence the distribution of the functional commands.

(43) Kronenberg, V.J.,

op_. cit.

pp. 75-76.
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(4) The Unification Debates
The debates on unification, which ensued from
1964 to 1967, became more furious as unification
loomed closer; in fact, several senior naval officers
were stunned when they came to realize that Mr. Hellyer
actually intended to pursue such a scheme.(44)
Although the debates on unification focused upon a
variety of issues from operational roles and command
structure to pay scales and retirement benefits, this
section is concerned with the principal opponents of
unification and the issues they raised.
While much of the criticism from the services,
particularly the Navy, was scarcely more than a
lament for the loss of service traditions, nonetheless,
Mr. Hellyer came under fire for the government's
apparent inability or unwillingness to divulge its
sources of military advice to support unification. Mr.
Hellyer himself did very little to dispel such criticism.(45)

(44)

Admiral Landymore, who has weathered several
attempts at integration and unification was
apparently the first to realize that Mr. Hellyer
was serious. Hellyer interview, August 1975."
(45) Hahn Committee. May 19, 1964 op. cit. pp. 30-31
Mr. Hellyer was questioned by Lambert as to the
organizational basis of unification, that is, who
had Hellyer consulted in devising this programme.
Mr. Hellyer refused to address himself to the
question. Lambert retorted that: "He is asking us
and Parliament to approve of it on his word and
that of the government."
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Mr. Terrence Nugent accused the Minister of National
Defence of ramrodding unification for no other purpose
than to "ensure his own greatness".(46) He further
argued that Mr. Hellyer's refusal to provide further
information about unification amounted to nothing more
than;"a barrage of propaganda and the bland assurance
of the Minister that all is well."(47)
Significantly, the roles which the Canadian
forces would be capable of carrying out came under
close scrutiny. W.B. Nesbitt stated that the Canadian
hybrid would be unable to co-ordinate its operations
with N.A.T.O. and N.O.R.A.D.; further, that the forces
were designed for a peacekeeping role exclusively which
would result in Canada surrendering other defence
responsibilities to the United States.(48)

The Associate

Minister of National Defence, Leo Cadieux, argued to
the contrary that precisely because of unification,
Canada would be better able to accomplish its designated
defence roles. He insisted that the $1.5 billion in
new equipment which included heavy artillery, anti-tank
missiles, mortars and anti-submarine systems were
obviously not for the purpose of peacekeeping missions
alone.(49)

(46) Debates, op. cit. January 31, 1967
(47) Ibid, p. 12478.
^ ) Ibid. pp. 12470-12474.
(49) Ibid, pp. 12535-12539.

p. 12477*
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The unification issue came to a head in
August 1966 when Paul Hellyer dismissed Admiral
Landymore for "eighteen months consistent disloyalty".
Hellyer was vehement in his condemnation of Landymore's
effort to organize support against unification:
"A small group of officers is trying to
run the Armed Forces...the civilian
control of the military is the main
issue...I have no intention of letting
anyone - even if he's an Admiral - tell
the government how to run the Armed
Forces."(50)
Mr. Hellyer later offered as a justification for firing
Admiral Landymore:
"to openly attempt to dictate a policy
contrary to that approved by Parliament
is simply not acceptable in a mature
democracy. The principle of civilian
control must be maintained."(51)
Following his dismissal, Admiral Landymore claimed that
it was "political science not military science,"(52)
behind unification.

He asserted that the proponents of

unification could only justify their case through the
explication of the merits of integration, not through
unification.(53)

He criticized the command structure of

(50) Byers, R.D. op_. cit. p. 9,
(51) Ibid, p. 9*
(52) Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
National Defence Proceedings (Ottawa: Queens
Printer 1967). 1967. Hereafter referred to as the
Groos Committee. February 15, 1967, p. 1049,
(53) Ibid, p. 1050.
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Mobile Command, as dangerous to democracy because of
the power invested in its commander.(54)
Although several other Canadian officers had
already expressed their disapproval of unification,
including among them General Foulkes, Rear Admiral
Brock, Major General Macklin and Air Marshal Curtis,
organized opposition surfaced in 1967 when the
Tri-Service Identities Organization (TRIO)(55) and the
Committee on the Maritime Component of the Canadian
Defence Forces(56) presented their briefs to the Groos
Committee.

These organizations were strongly opposed

to unification arguing that; (a)since unification did
not have the support of many serving officers its
credibility was in doubt, (b)that the Defence Council
did not have sufficient service representation, (c)that
the officers who were retired prematurely were instructed
to as a result of their opposition to unification,
(d)that the degree of civilian^_control was excessive.
Opposition to unification then, still centred
upon the relative advantages of integration vis a vis
unification.

In response to his critics Mr. Hellyer

had consistently argued that:

(54) Ibid. p. 1086.
(55) Ibid. February 10, I967, pp. 734-741.
(56) Ibid. February 13, 1967, pp. 889-919.
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"no over-all strategic plan applied
to the three services...there was no
over-all co-ordination of the
equipment programmes in the sense
that priorities were established on
a hard basis to fulfill national
objectives..."(57)
The tendency of the Chiefs of Staff to support each
other's requests for equipment on a quid pro quo basis
meant that such equipment purchases were not based upon
national needs, but rather upon those of the individual
services and their commanders.(58)
Although the Navy had persistently sought to
stress the distinctiveness of its service roles and
traditions, Mr. Hellyer argued that such a xenophobic
point of view tended to: "preserve the traditions of a
particular service rather than contributing to the total
defence picture".(59)

To illustrate his point, Mr.

Hellyer cited the inter-service rivalry over the
Caribou aircraft between the Army and the R.CA.F., and
the dispute over the N.A.T.O. 7.62 rifle which the Army
had wanted but the R.CA.F. and R.C.N, had not. It
took five years to finally procure the rifle.(60)
In response to criticism that integration alone
would resolve Canadian defense problems without the
negative aspects of unification, Mr. Hellyer replied

(57) Debates. op. cit. February 3, 1967, pp. 14431-14433.
(58) Groos Committee, op. cit. February 23, 1967, p. 1562.
(59) Ibid, p. 1562.
(60) Ibid, p. 1562.
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that:
"It would be impossible to maintain
integrated forces over a long
period of time. Integration is not
a stable position.n(6l)

(6) Summary
The transition from separate to a Unified service
was at times a painful endeavour.

The change to

functional command proceeded relatively smoothly because
in many instances, the new structure did not necessitate
sweeping reform; many roles under both systems were
similar.

At headquarters it had been an altogether

different situation since unification sought to impose
nwhat

was essentially a civilian mode of organization

upon a military structure; this was even more complex
during the initial stages because the two systems of
organization were both operative at the same time. This,
coupled with the government's failure to produce a
detailed plan for reorganization, meant that^there were
many changes in roles and responsibilities as the
government attempted to 'muddle through*.
Defence policy, then, under the Pearson
government, had accomplished a number of significant
tasks: the redefinition of defence policy priorities,

(61) Ibid,

p. 1582.
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while not entirely in conformity with a 'national
mission', had decreased dependence upon alliance
systems in the determination of policy and equipment
procurement; it had reorganized the armed forces into
a unified body and eliminated many of the redundancies
and archaic traditions endemic to separate services;
the new command structure had been designed along
functional lines rather than corresponding to traditional
service tasks. Of singular importance is that through
unification, the 'restructuring of influence' had
unquestionably asserted the principle of civilian
control and direction of the military.
As described in chapter four, although Mr.
Pearson's government had stimulated new sources of policy
input and had provided the machinery for long-range
defence planning, the transition in the policy-making
process was not complete.

It remained for Prime Minister

Trudeau to be the innovator of the 'optimal policy-making
system'.

In terms of defence, this meant, (a)the

reappraisal of the objectives of defence policy in
congruence with national objectives, and (b)the
determination of the management changes necessary to
accomplish them.
Significantly, this chapter also suggests, through
an examination of the effects of optimal policy-making
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upon the political executive and the defence
establishment, that the transition in the policymaking system is continuing.

Unlike Doern and

Aucoin, who have assumed,incorrectly, that the
policy-making process occurs in a linear progression,
this chapter suggests that the over-centralization
of authority, and the failure to recognize the
necessity of 'special skills', namely, those of the
military, shall have serious implications for
parliamentary government and for the military's
ability to accomplish its assigned roles.
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Chapter IV:

The Trudeau Period:
Systems Management

Although the previous Liberal government was
instrumental in developing nev sources of policy
initiative, they evolved largely because of the
•benevolent acquiescence*(1) of Pearson rather than
being a clearly determined attempt to reform the
policy-making structure.

The Pearson government,

despite such sources of policy initiative, remained
attuned to the incrementalism of the past and made
little effort to co-ordinate programmes on a crossdepartmental basis; this is not however, so much a
criticism of Pearson as it is the recognition that
programme management was then not a mature phenomenon.
With the advent of Pierre E. Trudeau as Prime
Minister, systems management had acquired an apostle,
for Trudeau was a protagonist of the ingestion of
•rationality* into government:
"Nationalism will eventually have to be
rejected as a principle of sound
government. In the world of tomorrow,
the expression 'banana republic' will
not refer to independent fruit growing
nations but to countries where formal
independence has been given priority
over the cybernetic revolution. In

/

(1) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of
Policy Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of
Political Science, op. cit. p. 248.
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short, if not a pure product of
reason, the political tools of the
future will be designed and
appraised by more rational standards
than anything we are currently using
in Canada today."(2)
Trudeau descended on Ottawa imbued with the spirit of
innovation, and disdain for the languid, incrementalistic
approach of his predecessors in the definition of policy
priorities:
"And some of these programmes - its
really incredible when you begin to
look at these in detail - some of
the programmes were started back in
the 1920*s - to meet a real need
then. But they no longer have the
same justification."(3)
He condemned policies and institutions whose effects
were debilitating on the government's ability to
exercize 'rational' decisions. He referred to Parliament
as *a Coney Island shooting gallery', perennially
dedicated to patching up crises but not resolving them.
Low priority programmes inherited from the past were to
be scrapped in order to funnel resources into high
priority policies.

The political party, the Prime

Minister explained:
"which is attuned to the needs of our
society is not one which confines
itself to particular employment or

(2) Doern, G.B. "The Policy-Making Philosophy of
Prime Minister Trudeau and his Advisors", in
T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 128.
(3) Ibid, p. 130.

,'
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income groups, or which speaks
for particular regions or language
i groups, but one which reaches out
to absorb the ideas and to reflect
the aspirations of all Canadians...
It may be that, in future, political
parties will be distinguished from
one another, not so much by issues,
as by the perspective in which they
view such issues and the method
which they employ in devising new
policies to resolve them."(4)
Trudeau then, clearly rejected the premises of

incrementalism and i t s costly hand-outs to disparate
groups and regions, he offered instead policy
determined by national objectives through the
co-ordination of programme outputs. He argued that a
bill of rights, that is, a declaration of goals, be
firmly ensconced in a constitution prior to the
differentiation of federal and provincial powers. He
distrusted the conservatism and influence of the civil
service in the making of government policy and
alternatively surrounded himself with computer and
communications specialists.(5)

Policy, then, would no

longer be aimed at what Noel has described as "the

(4) Hockin, T.A. "Pierre Trudeau on the Prime Minister
and the Participant Party", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit.
pp. 97-100.
(5) Doern, G.B. "The Policy Making Philosophy of Prime
Minister Trudeau and his Advisors', in T.A. Hockin.
op. cit. p. 133.
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accomodation of elites",(6) in the absense of national
symbols and goals, but rather upon the optimization of
policy objectives as they relate to other policies and
available resources.(7)
Critical to such a policy orientation (and to
any other) are the sources of Prime Ministerial advice;
the distinctiveness of the Trudeau regime however, has
been the rapid expansion of these sources. As Stewart
points out, in 1967, under Pearson, the P.M.O. had 12
members, the P.CO. 156; under Trudeau the P.M.O. had
increased to 92 and the P.CO. to 292 by 1972.(8)
Quite apart from quantitative changes, there have also
been a number of substantive changes in the organization
of the P.M.O. and P.CO.

(6) Noel, S.J.R. "The Prime Ministers Role in a
Consociational Democracy", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit.
p. 104. Noel argues that in a nation such as
Canada, having no national symbols but numerous
subcultures, a Prime Minister may continue to
govern only through accomodation of elites at the
provincial level.
(7) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making
System: Implications for the Canadian Political
Process", in T.A. Hockin. op_. cit. p. 137.
Szablowski states that: "optimizing is concerned
with the relations among objectives. Thus, a
decision-maker considers the adoption of a specific
policy aiming at a specific goal must take into
account all other policy goals relevant to the issue
area and the resource requirements needed for their
implementation." Such policy would have precedence
over the regional accommodation of elites, p. 137.
(8) Stewart, Walter. Trudeau in Power. (New York:
Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971). p. 179.
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(1) Expansion of Government Institutions
There have been three major developments in
the P.CO., the first of these being the appointment
of three deputy secretaries whose functions are
planning, operations and federal-provincial relations.
Their significance is that they are more concerned with
policy development, rather than acting as secretaries
to the Cabinet. Secondly, Michael Pitfield, a
personal friend of the Prime Minister and an advocate
of 'rational* policy-making, was chosen to head the
P.CO. planning group.(9)
pertains

The third development

to the Cabinet Committees whereby the Prime

Minister is the Chairman of the Federal-Provincial
Relations Committee and the Planning and Priorities
Committee.(10)

There are nine such standing committees,

including the External Affairs and Defence Committee.
As well, there are several functional committees of a
temporary or ad hoc nature which have resulted in the
appointment of additional assistant secretaries in the
P.CO.

As Doern points out:
"The net result of the committee system
is that most issues that go before the

(9) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin
op. cit. pp. 54-55.
(10) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet
History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. 0£. cit.
p. 44.
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full Cabinet will have been assessed
in at least one of the Cabinet
sub-committees. Also many matters
are actually decided by the Committee
in that formal Cabinet approval is
assured unless there is a division in
the Committee or unless a Minister
has strong views and wishes to take
it to the full Cabinet."(11)
The sheer volume of committee work however,
could be deleterious to a Minister*s other
responsibilities, and so the P.M.O.s function is to;
"Differentiate and improve the quality of...the
political input into policy deliberations."(12)

As a

consequence, the role played by Tom Kent under Mr.
Pearson has been expanded and formalized under Trudeau.
In addition, the P.M.O. seeks to; * ensure that P.M.O.
inputs are present at the very earliest stages of
policy formulation* and therefore; "representatives of
the P.M.O. sit on various inter-departmental
committees...and on committees of the Privy Council
Office."(13)

There are, in addition, several other steps,

including P.M.O.-P.CO. co-ordinating meetings, during
which the Prime Minister attempts to ensure a political
•presence* in policy development.(14)

Trudeau has also

(11) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organization
in the Executive Arena," in T.A. Hockin. o£. cit.
pp. 56-57.
(12) Ibid, pp. 56-57.
(13) Schindler, F. "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet
History and Development", in T.A. Hockin. p. 45.
(14) Ibid. p. 46.
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utilized the creation of Ministers without
Portfolio, to augment political inputs, as well as
'regional desks', to keep in touch with party officials
and 'backbenchers' .
This liason between the P.M.O. and the P.CO.
also had important implications for P.P.B.S. Whereas
P.P.B.S., as contemplated by the Pearson government,
was centred upon fiscal control and programme outputs
on a departmental basis, under Trudeau, P.P.B.S. is
intimately involved with the central organs of the
policy process itself.

P.P.B.S. then becomes an;

"information system designed to produce and recombine
information in such a way that it will serve planning
programming and budgeting objectives in an integrative
way."(15)

To this end, resources are allocated on the

basis of broad functional categories, including among
them, health and welfare, government services, defence,
and others; as a result, the department is no longer
the basic unit of policy determination.

The Cabinet

Committee on Priorities and Planning, chaired by the
Prime Minister^ "expresses its priorities for any
given year according to these broad functional categories."(16)

(15) Doern, G.B. "The Budgetary Process and the Role of
the Federal Bureaucracy", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin.
op. cit. p. 89.
(16) Ibid, p. 91.
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In addition, the Treasury Board, through P.P.B.S., is

engaged i n long-range planning for resource a l l o c a t i o n s .
There have also been significant changes in
other sources-of policy input'; Mr. Trudeau, unlike his
predecessors, has tended to prefer 'task forces' over
Royal Commissions. As Wilson points out, however:
"The entire process of using outside
consultants and task forces, and the
creation of an inventory of professional
personnel outside of government whose
talents could be tapped on a temporary
basis, do indicate a concerted effort
to place the Prime Minister's Office in
a strong controlling position over
policy formation."(17)
- Task forces have come under fire for a variety of reasons.
By way of example, Mr. Hellyer*s housing task force/,,s
drew criticism for its methodological weaknesses and
insufficient expertise.(18)

Furthermore, the task

forces are not required to publish their results, and
consequently, their research findings are available
only to the Cabinet and perhaps to some senior civil servants,
to the exclusion of Parliament.(19)
The changing role of White Papers is clearly
aligned with the Prime Minister*s predilections for

(17) Wilson, U.S. "The Role of Royal Commissions and
Task Forces", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin. op. cit.
p. 123.
(18) Ibid, p. 125.
(19) Ibid, p. 124.
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cybernetics, that is, the White Paper becomes a
communication interaction mechanism*(20) between the
government and the public. As Wilson points out;
"(the) rationalistic approach to policymaking emphasizes long-range planning
and review. Thus, the White Paper is
conceived of as a part of a larger
exercise of review."(21)
Although there have been a number of White Papers on
diverse policy issues, Doerr asserts that their
objective, to stimulate public debate, has not been
entirely successful principally because there has not
been a public forum for debate.(22)

This problem has to

some degree been resolved as witnessed by the more recent
•green* papers and public discussions on immigration
policy.
The examples provided by the relationship
between the Science Council, the National Research
Council, and the Medical Research Council are instructive
as to the dilemmas which the government

encountered

when it attempted to append a functional advisory
council having its own area of responsibility into a
P.P.B.S. system.

(20)

Doerr, A.D. "The Role of White Papers", in G.B.
Doern and P. Aucoin, op_. cit. p. 186.
(21) Ibid, p. 185.
(22) Ibid, p. 198.
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The Science Council, which was to be the policy
overseer of the other councils, proved to be; "excessively
preoccupied with developing its long-range rationalistic
posture"(23) and not on policy development.

The National

Research Council and the Medical Research Council prefer
to ignore the Science Council and cultivate instead
whatever scientific activity they are presently engaged
in.

As Aucoin points out, their approach to policy has

been entirely incremental and seemingly dedicated to;
"frustrating the attempts of the Federal Government to
establish science policies to accomplish national
goals."(24)

As Doern has suggested, the relationship

between such organizations must be subject to revision:
"not on the naive assumption that somehow
the total policy-making process must
have some central deposits of information,
but rather the assumption that it is
important that the relationship between
such organizations be conceptualized in
some way."(25)
The Economic Council of Canada has also changed
significantly in regard to its contribution to policy

(23)

Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of
Policy-Making in Canada",in Canadian Journal of
Political Science, op. cit. p. 262.
(24) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin.
op. cit. p. 75.
(25) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of
Policy-Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of
Political Science, op. cit. p. 202.
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development.

Under Pearson, the Economic Council was

preoccupied with what it has called * performance goals*
including among its research areas regional development,
tariffs, manpower and transportation policy.(26)

In

1969 however, following the poverty report, the Economic
Council expressed their interest in * achievement
goals*(27), that is, fundamental national objectives.
This was in part a reaction to the limited role which
P.P.B.S. had played under Mr. Pearson.

Under Mr.

Trudeau, however, there was congruence between the
Prime Minister*s desire for * counterweights*(28) of
policy input and the Economic Council's willingness to
provide them.
The Trudeau period has witnessed many significant
changes in the policy-making process: the expansion,
differentiation and formalization of policy roles in
the P.M.O. and P.CO.;

the expanded responsibilities of

the Treasury Board in the implementation of P.P.B.S.;
the emergence of functional committees in the Cabinet
Secretariat; the pervasive influence of the Prime
Minister in P.CO.-P.M.O. liason and the Priorities and

(26)

Phidd, R.W. "The Role of Central Advisory Councils:
The Economic Council of Canada", in G.B. Doern and
P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 236.
(27) Ibid, p. 237.
(28) Doern, G.B. "Recent Changes in the Philosophy of
Policy-Making in Canada", in Canadian Journal of
Political Science. op. cit. p. 25.
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Planning Committee; the activist role of the Economic
Council of Canada in pursuant of 'achievement goals';
the public debate encouraged by the use of White
Papers as interaction mechanisms. The emphasis placed
upon planning and the defining of priorities is of
course underscored by the Prime Minister's personal
philosophy of policy development; policy as functional
categories of cross-departmental programme outputs. It
is to be anticipated that such tendencies would reveal
themselves as well in defence policy.

(2) Defence Policy and the Role of Unified Forces
Unification had accomplished many of its
objectives: (a) the Chiefs of Staff were integrated
under a single Chief of Defence Staff; (b) the traditional
lines of command were dispersed with the imposition of
functional command; (c) separate services were
eliminated, and (d) civilian direction and control had
been firmly established. What remained to be determined
however, was the objectives of defence policy, that is,
what role was the military to play.
\.

Congruent with the Prime Minister's policy /

objectives and methods, he announced a foreign policy
statement in April, 1969, outlining the impending
redefinition of Canadian defence policy.

x

Mr. Trudeau

\
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argued that:
"N.A.T.O. had in reality determined all
of our defence policy. We had no defence
policy, so to speak, except that of
N.A.T.O. And our defence policy had
determined all of our foreign policy...
It is a false perspective to have a
military alliance determine your foreign
policy. It should be your foreign
policy which determines your military
policy."(29)
Subsequently the new priorities for defence were to
emphasize the protection of Canadian sovereignty rather
than alliance commitments.
The review of defence policy had been going on
since 1969 and culminated in the publication of a
White Paper in 1971, Defence in the 70% under the
authority of the new Minister of National Defence,
Donald MacDonald.

The influence of the foreign policy

review was clearly evident:
"Defence policy cannot be developed in
isolation. It must reflect and serve
national interests, and must be closely
related to foreign policy which the
government reviewed concurrently with
defence. In the course of these reviews
the principle that defence policy must
be in phase with the broader external
projection of national interests was
underlined."(30)

(29)
(30)

Canada, Department of External Affairs. Statements
and Speeches. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969).
April 12, 1969. pp.2-4.
Canada, Department of National Defence. Defence
in the 70's. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1971). p. 3.
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Citing the "increase in stability in nuclear
deterrence" and the "return to a form of multi-polarity in
the international system"(31), the White Paper on Defence
argues that:
"A catastrophic war between the super powers
constitutes the only major military threat
to Canada...Canada's overriding defence
objective must therefore be the prevention of
nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation
to ease the underlying causes of tension, by
working for arms control and disarmament agreements
and by contributing to the system of stable
mutual deterrence."(32)
While declaring allegiance to alliance commitments however,
the White Paper directs attention to the maintenance of
sovereignty through surveillance, norther development and
aid to the civil power.

The priorities for Canadian

defence therefore become:
"(a) the surveillance of our own territory and
coast lines: i.e. the protection of our
sovereignty; (b) the defence of North America
in co-operation with U.S. forces; (c) the
fulfillment of such N.A.T.O. commitments as
may be agreed upon; (d) the performance of
such international peacekeeping roles as we
may from time to time assume."(33)
The elucidation of such priorities stands in contrast to the
collective security and peacekeeping roles that the Pearson
government was so enamoured with.

Protection of sovereignty

would include surveillance of violations of Canadian airspace,
which would be, in part, operative through N.O.R.A.D.
installations, although a number of these were shut down.
Also, surveillance would be undertaken to ensure control

(3D Ibid,
(32) Ibid,
(33) Tbid.

p. 4.
p. 6.
p. 16.
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of northern regions and coastal waterways; the latter would
embrace such items of assistance to the civil authorities
as patrolling foreign fishing fleets, ice reconnaissance
and mineral explorations.(34)

The Canadian land forces

would also come to the aid of the civil power should the
need arise as in the case of the October crisis and the
rioting at Kingston Penitentiary.
The Canadian contribution to North American defence
would also acquire new characteristics. While reaffirming
that co-operation with the U.S.;"will remain essential so
long as our joint security depends on stability in the
strategic nuclear balance", the government decided to curtail
the Bomarc anti-bomber defence and to reduce the significance
of the anti-submarine warfare role in preference to other
maritime duties. Furthermore, the Honest John system was
abandoned and the CF104s would drop the nuclear strike role
in Europe; therefore, only the CF101 Voodoos would require
a nuclear capacity.(35)
In April, 1969, the Prime Minister announced that
as part of the defence policy review, N.A.T.O. contributions
would be reduced.(36)

As Szablowski points out, this

too was another example of optimized planning.

(34) Ibid, pp. 16-24.
(35) TbTd. p. 30.
(36) Canada, Department of External Affairs. "A Defence
Policy for Canada" in External Affairs . (Ottawa:
Queens Printer, 1969). Vol. XXI, No. 5, May, 1969.
N.A.T.O. contributions were to be reduced because
of the economic and military recovery of Europe.
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The government reason was that:
"continued deployment of resources to
N.A.T.O. at the same level would have
resulted in the progressive minimization
of the aggregate output in the entire
defence policy area because of the size
of the N.A.T.O. resource allocation
relative to the remaining defence policy
goals."(37)
Resources diverted from N.A.T.O. could be then applied
to higher priority tasks, namely surveillance.
The White Paper on Defence made evident Canada's
disenchantment with, though continued willingness to
participate in, peacekeeping operations.
"The experience has all too often been
frustrating and disillusioning. Some
operations have been severely hampered
by inadequate terms of reference and
by a lack of co-ordination on the part
of those involved. Other detrimental
factors have been the absense of
political support of some of the great
powers, and insufficient international
logistic and financial resources.
Certain operations have tended to
become 'open ended* in the absense of
political settlement between the
parties to a dispute."(3^)
Such circumstances were re-confirmed during Canada's
participation in the I . C C S . mission in Vietnam; (39)

(37) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System:
Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in
T.A. Hockin. ojo. cit. p. 137.
(38) White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70*s. op. cit.
p. 40.
(39) Viet-Nam: Canada*s Approach to Participation in the
International Commission of Control and Supervision.
Canada, Department of External Affairs, (Ottawa:
Queens Printer, 1973) p. 16.
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Canada subsequently withdrew from the mission; having become
somewhat

more particular about the criteria upon

which to engage in peacekeeping.(40)
Following the publication of Defence in the
70*s. the Department of National Defence began
publishing a yearly review of the activities of the
department, cautioning however, that these publications
were for the purpose of review only, not policy
papers.(41)

These reviews did not deviate substantially

from the White Paper on Defence, in terms of the
objectives of national defence; there was however, a
number of managerial changes which carried serious
implications.
The first of these to be considered, given Mr.
Trudeau*s 'optimal policy' stance and his insistence
on cross-departmental functional outputs, were the
defence priorities established in the White Paper which
required the participation of several departments to
accomplish these objectives. Since the military, prior
to unification, was more accustomed to tending its own

(40)

Proceedings from the Atlantic Council of Canada.
Toronto. May, 1975. The discussion focused on
the pre-conditions for Canada's participations in
peacekeeping operations.
(41) Canada, Department of National Defence. Defence 1972
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1973). In the preface to
Defence 1972, Minister of National Defence
Richardson was emphatic that these annual reviews did
not indicate impending policy changes.
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backyard, the co-ordination of departments became a
difficult task.

As J.F. Anderson, Director of

Programme Analysis, and Dr. J.C Arnell, Assistant
Deputy Minister (Finance) of the Department of
National Defence, report, since:
"the principal, if not the only, direct
military threat to Canada's national
security is that incidental to nuclear
war...which Canada is unable to escape...
or prevent such an attack...Canada is
incapable of establishing its security
requirements in terms of a direct defence
of its national territory...The consequence
is that there is really no way for the
Canadian defence analyst to define
objectively either an upper or lower limit
of the amount of resources which Canada
should expend on its own defence."(42)
This was of course, further compounded by the 'nonmilitary* nature of some of the new defence priorities.
Dr. Arnell(43) and Mr. Anderson argued that these
priorities required greater ministerial direction and
cross-departmental co-ordination to determine the degree

(42)

Anderson, J.F. and Arnell, J.C. "Programme
Management in the Department of National Defence",
in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol I, No. 2. p. 31.
(43) Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on
External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence, Hahn Committee. Nov. 21,
1968. Dr. Arnell detailed the difficulties
encountered in attempting to apply P.P.B.S. to
services accustomed only to a "single operational
environment", pp. 550-554.
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of support which the military would provide,
particularly with reference to surveillance. Such
direction and co-ordination ultimately involved the
Departments of Fisheries, Transport, Indian Affairs,
Energy, National Revenue, and the R.CM.P.
It is scarcely surprising that such complex
relationships gave rise to the need for a Management
Review Group, created in 1971 to;"improve the
co-ordination between the military, civilian and
research staffs of the Department."(44)

The

Management Review Group sought to dispose of what was
essentially two staffs, one civilian, another military,
working under the Minister of National Defence.

This

had created needless duplication of effort and serious
problems of co-ordination.
Under the new system, both the Deputy Minister
and the Chief of Defence Staff are jointly responsible
for military management, supplemented by the appointment
of several assistant Deputy Ministers, functionally
organized.

Both the Chief of Defence Staff and the

Deputy Minister however, do retain some explicit power
of their office, in the former case the control and
administration of the forces, and in the Deputy Minister*s

(^)

Ibid,

pp. 12-13.
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case, the powers to act on behalf of the Minister.(45)
The military chain of command outside of headquarters,
is retained.

Nevertheless, the implications of such

changes are that there has been an injection of civilian
staff and management techniques into headquarters.
(3) The Effect of Optimal Policy-Making
Policy-making in Canada has passed through three
distinct stages; the *fused, personalized and passive*
policy organizationsunder Mr. Diefenbaker; the
beginning of new sources of policy initiative and the
differentiation of policy roles, co-terminus with
incrementalism, under Mr. Pearson; the expanded,
formalized, differentiated, and active sources of policy
inputs under Mr. Trudeau. Defence policy, similarly,
has evolved in congruence with the policy-making
structure:

under Mr. Diefenbaker, the excessive

influence of the military in the determination of policy
and, the indecisiveness which led to adherence to
previous policy and equipment commitments; under Mr.
Pearson, the review and reorientation of such
commitments, and the attempts, through unification, to
exercise civilian control and ultimately civilian
direction over the military; the Trudeau period, which
has dramatically redefined defence priorities,

(45)

Ibid,

pp. 13-15.
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consolidated civilian control and imposed civilian
direction even within the chain of command at
headquarters.
One could conclude from this that the
Optimization of policy* and the 'civilianization' of
the military, is the *best of all possible worlds*,
wherein the current military malaise is but an
aberration from the logical progression of systems.
Such a conclusion becomes suspect however, given the
fact that under the current Minister of National Defence,
James Richardson, the de-unification process has begun.
Furthermore, recent years have witnessed a deterioration
in the enthusiasm for P.P.B.S. as the foundation of
policy development, as well as resentment over the Prime
Minister*s methods in introducing policy proposals.
Such events have raised crucial questions not only
concerning defence policy, but about the nature of
policy-making, indeed, parliamentary government itself.
(a) Prime Ministerial Government and P.P.B.S.
With reference to the source of Prime Ministerial
authority, Szablowski points out that:
"The traditional relationship between the
Canadian Prime Minister and his Cabinet
colleagues has to be transactional. It
permits Ministers to retain regional
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loyalties and to represent
regional interests within the
Cabinet."(46)
Provincial leaders expect bargaining concessions from
the Prime Minister.(47)

Thrcrugh the optimal policy-

making system, the Prime Minister dispenses functional
responsibilities to his Cabinet members who, as a
result; "tend to discard regional loyalties...and
bargaining on behalf of regional interest".(48)

If, as

Noel suggests, the ability to govern is based on the
accommodation of elites at the regional level) "then any
policy-making system and its decisional technology
which may either weaken or modify these consociational
leadership roles strikes at the fundamental determinants
of stability". (49)
Policy-making based on P.P.B.S. has been
subject to criticism and has been fraught with
difficulties; one example of which was mentioned earlier
concerning the implementation of new defence priorities.
The Treasury Board found that it was rather problematical
to align functional classifications of priorities such

(46) Szablowski, G.F. "The Optimal Policy Making System:
Implications for the Canadian Political Process", in
T.A. Hockin, op_. cit. p. 143.
(47) Ibid, p. 142.
(48) Ibid, p. 144.
(49) IbTd". p. 142.
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as 'national unity' and 'pollution' with existing
functional categories. As Doern states; "The Treasury
Board was then required to...ask departments which of
their programmes could be identified as assisting the
function of national unity."(50)

Programme forecasts by

departments, rather than being expressed functionally, are
still very much incremental and department oriented.(51)
Disagreement has arisen between Ottawa and the Provinces
as to the implementation of P.P.B.S.

As Doern points out,

the government has recognized that: "incrementalism has
come to be characterized less as an unfortunate
aberration from P.P.B.S. principles, and more as an
inevitable and even necessary element of a policy and
budgetary philosophy."(52)
Although Doern concludes that the pervasive
influence of P.P.B.S. over the determination of planning,
and priorities has engendered 'confidence*(53) among
senior government and civil service officials, this is
scarcely a unanimous perspective. Walter Stewart alleges
that policy is developed not by the elected
representatives in Cabinet, but rather by a 'supergroup1

(50) Doern, G.B. "The Budgetary Process and the Policy
Role of the Federal Bureaucracy", in G.B. Doern
and P. Aucoin. op_. cit. p. 97.
(51) Ibid, p. 97.
(52) Ibid, p. 98.
(53) Ibid, p. 103.
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of hand-picked Trudeau cohorts in the P.CO. and P.M.O.
Eric Kierans resigned from the Cabinet largely because
of the inability of Cabinet members to influence policy
which had already been decided upon by the P.M.O. and
P.CO.(54)

His resignation illustrates Doern1s point

that policy is often determined by Cabinet Committees
rather than by the Cabinet itself.(55)
The influence of the Prime Minister and his
staff has been described as analogous to that of the
American President and his advisors. Denis Smith argues
that through the parliamentary reforms of 1968 by which
the Trudeau government; "diverted detailed debate on
all estimates and virtually all legislation from the
floor of the House to specialized committees,"(56)
and through Rule 75C, which permitted the government
to; "in the absense of agreement by the other parties,...
timetable discussions on the stage of individual
bills."(57)

Smith contends that through Prime

Ministerial power over the bureaucracy, the Prime
Minister has$ "created around him a presidential

(54) Stewart, Walter. op_. cit. pp. 166-170.
(55) Doern, G.B. "The Development of Policy Organizations
in the Executive Arena", in G.B. Doern and P. Aucoin.
op. cit. pp. 55-56.
(56) Smith, Denis, "President and Parliament: The
Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada",
in T.A. Hockin. op. cit. p. 237.
(57) Ibid, p. 237.
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office".(58)

Although Smith ascribes to Trudeau

"unerring presidential instincts",(59) the value of
his research is not so much his conclusions but rather
the evidence he compiles to indicate the tremendous
control and power exercized by Mr. Trudeau over policymaking.

The implications for the Canadian political

process are that while the characterization of the
Trudeau government as * parliamentary* may well be naive,
intimations of a * closet president* are brash and
eclectic.

No doubt, however, Canada does have "prime

ministerial" government.

(b) Military Professionalism and De-unification
Certainly one of the most disturbing aspects of
the redefinition of defence priorities has been the
deterioration of military morale with particular regard
to what many members of the military consider a decline
in professionalism.

The critical issues appear to be

the perceived ascendency of military managers over
commanders and the * non-military* roles prescribed by
Defence in the 70*s.

(53)
(59)

Ibid,
Ibid,

p. 239.
p. 238.
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As Colonel A.P. Wills points out:
"In our lemming-like rush to espouse the
totems of management theory...we seem
to have lost sight of those fundamental
attitudes and practices which have
eternally assured that a military force
is greater than the sum of its parts...
Although of like size to a large
corporation, the Canadian forces serve
a different purpose and must be
fundamentally different in nature and
outlook."(60)
Implicit in Colonel Wills* remark is the rejection of
civilian management of the military in the absence of
retaining those characteristics which are distinctively
military.

This sentiment persists; it is the view

that military professionalism is derived from the
traditional values of leadership, command and military
training, exercized in response to a foreseen or
unforeable threat to national security.

As Major

T.B. Winfield points out:
"No management theory, civilianizing
process, technical revolution or edict
from on high, will elicit the deserved
response from units or servicemen in
action. Those who have not learned
about leadership in peace will not
^ commence to practice it in war. If
we condone in peacetime promotion on
the basis of administrative or technical
competence alone, we may well be seen
to lack what it takes to respond to
our country*s expectations in an
emergency."(61)

(60) Wills, Colonel A.P. "What the Service Needs is a
Return to the Old Military Virtues", in Canadian
Defence Quarterly. Vol. 4, No. 3, 1974. pp. 7-8.
(61) Winfield, Major T.B. "Challenge, Isolation and
Burden of Command", in Canadian Defence Quarterly.

vol. 4, NO. 4. 1975.

p~ryr.
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The corollary problem of course is the emphasis
upon * national development* and aid to the civil
authority in the absence of more *respectable* military
occupations. Such dilemmas led to a seminar in
Kingston in 1971, on the question of professionalism in
the services.

Richard Preston contributed a paper

which argued that although the military may resent such
•civilian* roles, strategic realities dictated that a
traditional military posture would, for Canada, be
unrealistic. He stressed that contributing to "national
development* was not unique nor without precedent in
the history of Canadian forces; further, given the
events of October, 1970 and the military participation
in that crisis, 'aid to the civil authorities* was a
legitimate and respectable military role.(62) He
recommended however, that critical to the maintenance of
a high standard of professionalism was multi-purpose
training to provide for 'conventional strategic
deterrence'(63) both domestically and abroad.

Despite

Preston's optimism, reluctance to perform 'civilian'

(62)

Preston, R.A. "The Military Profession in Canada
in the Seventies: Its Potential for Contribution
to Conventional Deterrence", in Papers from
Contributors to the Study of Professionalism in
the Armed Forces.C.D.S. Directive 5/2/70 (Ottawa:
Queens Printer,~1970) pp. 9-19.
(63) Ibid, p. 19.
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roles does not appear to have diminished.
The civilianizing of management of the forces
continues to be a source of irritation, if not outrage,
for the military.

The positive benefits of civilian

control and direction have become mired in the excesses
of civilian hegemony through the obsession with optimal
planning. With the restructuring of headquarters, the
responsibilities of the Deputy Minister and the Chief
of Defence Staff were merged.

As a result, the chain

of command is interspersed with civilians who know little
about military operations(64) and whose:
"sympathies and aspirations seem likely
to lie with the Treasury Board and the
civil service hierarchy. As a result
of this merger, the field commanders
report to the C D . S . and the staff
report to the Deputy Minister. This
makes the Minister the Commander-inChief...The C D . S . could perhaps be
considered the Commander-in-Chief
except that his every move and direction
has to have the support and concurrence
of the Deputy Minister, who controls in
exacting detail, all policy development
and the provision and administration
of personnel and materiel."(65)
The restructuring at headquarters also provided
for the appointment of Assistant Deputy Ministers having

(64) Neelin, Colonel J.E. and Pederson, Colonel L.M.
"The Administrative Structure of the Canadian
Armed Forces: Over-Centralized and Overly Staff
Ridden", in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Vol 4,
No. 2, 1974. pp. 36-37.
(65) Ibid, p. 37.
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functional responsibilities (policy and strategic
planning, personnel, finance and materiel).

As Colonel

J.E. Neelin and Colonel L.M. Pederson point out:
"It is the A.D.M.s who develop and define
military policy...It is therefore the
D.M. and the A.D.M.s who perform the
important military functions, vis & vis
the CD.S. and the commanders. Their
enormous authority reaches down through
separate channels to the lowest field
units and there seemed to be no way they
can be held to account for anything
short of calamitous failure."(66)
The concern then, and it is quite justifiable, is that
in the event of an emergency situation, the Canadian
response will be exercized by staff officers and
civilians through an extraordinary centralized, complex
and lengthy chain of command.
The preface to de-unification occurred in the
fall of 1974 when Minister of National Defence,
Richardson, threatened defence budget cuts, which would
reduce personnel and prohibit the purchase of desperately
needed new equipment while at the same time requiring
continued multi-tasking.

Richardson argued that it was

better to have a well equipped force of 50,000 than
80,000 who were not. As John Gellner has asserted,
Richardson's point was: "...irrelevant.

If the mission

of an armed force is such that it cannot be accomplished

(66) Ibid.

P. 38.
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by 50,000 men then it obviously does not greatly
matter how well paid they are or how well fed and
equipped."(67)

Criticism poured in from the military,

the Royal Canadian Legion and the Canadian Defence
Association.

In November, the government announced an

11.2$ increase in military spending.(68)
In mid-January of this year, Mr. Richardson
announced the creation of an Air Command and a $275
million increase in the defence budget:(69)
"Once again, the Canadian Armed Forces
will have three distinct commands the Sea, the Land, and the Air. The
CD.S. General Dextraze and I have come
to the conclusion that it is of the
greatest importance for the Sailor, the
Soldier and the Airman, while still
being part of a unified force, to remain
within, and to progress within, specific
service channeIs...we have decided to
form an Air Command similar in function
to the Maritime and Mobile Command."(70)
A few weeks later, in February, Mr. Richardson suggested that
the N.O.R.A.D. agreement be extended indefinitely.

In

May, he announced that Canada would henceforth control

(67)

Gellner, John. "Cutting Budget or Undercutting
Defence", in the Globe and Mail, (October 15, 1974).
p. 7.
(68) "Battle of the Budget", in Time. January 27, 1975.
Vol. 105, No. 4, p. 4.
(69) "Defence Shakeup to Give Canada an Air Command",
in Toronto Daily Star, January 17, 1975. p. 1.
(70) Richardson, Minister of Defence, James, quoted in
Major M.B. Gausden. "Defence Limps On Despite
Inflation; Major Questions Still Unresolved;
Unification Begins to Bow Out", in Royal Canadian
Military Institute Year Book. 1974. (Toronto: Royal
Canadian Military Institute, 1975). p. 8.
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her own air defence with two new N.O.R.A.D. regions
in North Bay and Edmonton.

The Air Command would be

placed in Winnipeg, Mr. Richardson's constituency.
It would be premature to judge how the new Air
Command will affect civil-military management at
headquarters, indeed, it may even be premature to
suggest that the forces are in fact, being de-unified.
Both Mr. Richardson and General Dextraze insist that
the forces shall remain 'unified'.(71)
however, are misleading.

Such statements

During a press conference in

Ottawa, Mr. Richardson distinctly left the impression
that 'unified' forces did not mean unification, but
rather 'integration'.

The implications of his remarks

are that the separation of land, sea and air contingents
are a return to the integration phase of the 1964 White
Paper on Defence.

(4) Summary
Despite Prime Minister Trudeau*s enthusiasm for
* rationally contrived* policy objectives, their
implementation through P.P.B.S. has been less than
entirely satisfactory.

The adjustment to cross-departmental

programming has produced confusion while at the same time,

(71)

"Defence Shakeup to give Canada an Air Command",
in Toronto Daily Star. op_. cit.
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recognition, that policy outputs may necessarily have
to incorporate incremental aspects as well. Furthermore,
the dramatically increased numbers of appointed policy
advisors has led some observers, and Cabinet members,
to believe that the Cabinet*s role in policy matters
has been surreptitiously handed over to the * supergroup*
in the P.M.O.
In defence matters, the co-ordination of other
departments with National Defence has proved complicated
and the redefinition of defence priorities has left the
military somewhat bewildered as to their appropriate
role.

This dilemma has been further compounded by the

permeation of headquarters with civilian staff and by
the recent announcements that command would be de-unified.
Such factors, coupled with the scarcity of resources for
equipment purchases are undoubtedly responsible for the
state of melancholy which has beset Canada*s armed
forces.
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Observations
This research paper was based on the premise
that previous analyses of /uniflcatJjHL>__emphasizing
service tradition and identity, command structures and
management, or even nationalism, were ^ne-f sufficient
to justify the agenda for unification as proposed by
Mr. Paul Hellyer.^ (The inadequacy of such analyses was
a result of the failure to comprehend unification as
a part of the political environment.

Unification was

inexorably related to the policy-process through
which the

civilian authority would attain its capability

to determine the priorities of defence.

This capability

could not be accomplished through integration, because
integration alone would not permit the * structuring
of influence* necessary in the policy-making process to
ensure the civilian control and direction of the military.
The ability of a government to determine its
defence policy, is directly related to the policy-making
process.

This is not to infer that the substantive

character of defence policy will necessarily change,but
rather, that the government*s ability to effect policy,
relative to the degree of competition with the defence
establishment, will change.

Unification then, became

the method through which the * structuring of influence*
in the policy-making process was transformed.
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The military's legacy, both during and after
World War II, of transgressing their responsibilities,
coupled with Mr. Diefenbaker's incrementalist approach
to policy and .his reliance upon General Pearkes, meant
that the civilian perspective in the formulation of
defence policy was severely limited.

It remained for

Mr. Pearson, and ultimately Mr. Hellyer, to re-assert
civilian supremacy.

This led of course, to the defence

policy review and unification.
Significantly, the transition in the 'structuring
of influence' which occurred between the government and
the defence establishment, paralleled the transition in
the policy-making process. The expansion and
differentiation of policy-making organs, the new sources
of policy input and the introduction of SIMPAC and
P.P.B.S. signalled a re-orientation as to how policy
V^would be determined.

The incrementalist approach to

policy, though still prevalent, would no longer be the
sole basis of policy planning.
With the election of Prime Minister Trudeau,
policy-making became even more synonymous with the
P.P.B.S. approach. Since unification had already cpnfirmed
civilian hegemony in defence matters,it remained for Mr.
Trudeau to incorporate defence policy into the
prescriptions of national policy objectives.

This then,
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was the defence policy review announced in April, 1969,
which culminated in the publication Defence in the 70*s.
Despite the initial confidence in a more
* rational* approach to policy-making, it soon became
evident that incrementalism would not be entirely
abandoned, nor could the Prime Minister*s staff presume
to acquire such a preponderance of influence in the
policy-making process without creating dissention at
the Cabinet level.

In terms of defence, the infusion

of civilians into National Defence Headquarters after
1971, coupled with what were regarded as * non-military*
roles for the Canadian Armed Forces, led to significant
consternation among serving officers as to their
* identity*.
The implications of these events are not, as
Messrs. Doern and Aucoin would have one believe, that
the policy-making process is evolving towards a 'greater
good*, expressed through a more highly differentiated,
expanded and centralized policy apparatus. Conversely,
this research paper suggests that the degree of
centralization endemic to an optimalized policy-making
process necessarily leads to entropy among the components
of the system.

This has resulted from the Government*s

failure to recognize the need for, as in the case of the
military, special skills, or the failure, or unwillingness
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of the Government to comprehend that the pervasive
influence of such a centralized hierarchy can lead to
the deterioration, as Szablowski has argued, of the
practices and .institutions upbn which it is founded.
Unification then, through asserting civilian
direction and control, has also prepared the stage
for Prime Minister Trudeau and his staff to inundate
the military command structure with civilians. This
is not intended to suggest that the Prime Minister*s
staff have become * commissars* to the field forces, but
rather that they have intruded into the management of
the forces at headquarters. Whereas Paul Hellyer
sought to assert civilian control through the elimination
of separate commands and the expansion of civilian
participation, under Pierre Trudeau the excesses of
civilian participation have contributed to the return
of elemental command, that is, de-unification.

This is

^undoubtedly a retrogressive step because separate
command structures, whether they are called Air Command,
MARCOM and MOBCOM, or Army, Navy and Air Force, will
inevitably lead to difficulties identical with those
which existed prior to the 1964 White Paper on Defence.
With the spectre of de-unification close at
hand, what emerges from this research is that if Canada
is to have a credible defence policy, one which is
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compatible both with the roles to be performed and
with the military, then Canada must refrain from
indulging in further structural change, and concentrate
upon accomplishing the priori-ties defined in Defence
in the 70*s.
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